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The Curious Case of the Missing Legal Analysis 
Lynn D. Wardle* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The decision of the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State,1 may 
be one of the most celebrated judicial decisions in recent history. In 
Baker the court held that the Vermont marriage law allowing only male-
female couples to marry violated the “Common Benefits” Clause of the 
state constitution, and that same-sex couples must either be allowed to 
enter marriage or some alternative union with legal status and benefits 
substantially equivalent to marriage. In the first two years and eight 
months since that decision was rendered in December 1999 until the 
week of this symposium, Baker was cited in at least 266 law review or 
journal articles.2 Nearly two-thirds of those publications (167 articles, 63 
percent of the total) can be described as supporting, lauding or endorsing 
the result, while just ten percent of the articles (27 pieces, 10 percent of 
the total) express any significant negative criticism of the decision 
(mostly raising separation of powers concerns).3 By any standard, six-to-
one is a very successful approval ratio. Unquestionably, Baker has been 
very popular with the literati of the law profession – mostly law 
professors and law students who write in law journals and law reviews. 
While Baker has been cited an extraordinary number of times in law 
reviews and journals, it has also been cited in ten cases in the first thirty-
 
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium” 
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young 
University.  The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School, or Brigham Young University. 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT. This 
article was presented as a paper at the Symposium on The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Claims: The 
Third Generation and Beyond, held at the Brigham Young University Law School on August 29, 
2003. I am indebted to my research assistants, Justin W. Starr, Brinton Wilkins, and Spencer 
McDonald for their valuable contributions. 
 1. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 2. See Appendix A, at the end of this article. I have not personally read all 266 articles, but I 
have read a sample of them. My excellent research assistant Justin Starr has read the relevant parts of 
all of them, and I have reviewed his research. 
 3. See infra Section III. 
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two months following its decision, which is not an insignificant number 
of subsequent citations. 
However, there are several curiosities about the case citations to and 
legal commentaries about the Baker decision. Most of the cases do not 
cite Baker for its analysis, and little attention is given to the court’s legal 
rationale. There is very little use or critical discussion of the legal 
analysis in either the cases or the commentary, and no court has followed 
its reasoning. These clues suggest that the legal analysis in Baker may be 
less than impressive. Indeed, upon close examination, the Baker majority 
opinion especially is seriously deficient in credible legal analysis. 
Despite numerous party and amicus briefs offered by some outstanding 
legal talent, one looks in vain in the majority opinion (and one of the 
concurring opinions) for sustained, credible legal analysis. Thus, Baker 
truly is the curious case of the missing legal analysis.4 
Part II of this paper reviews the citation to and use of Baker in the 
courts. It is noted that the Baker analysis has had virtually no impact 
upon legal analysis in other jurisdictions. Further, surprisingly, the legal 
analysis in Baker has had only de minimis impact even in Vermont, 
where so far Baker is virtually sui generis. 
Next, in Part III the limited consideration of the crucial legal analysis 
in Baker by legal commentators is briefly noted. Most of the supportive 
legal literature has been celebratory, rather than analytical, focusing on 
the policy outcome rather than the legal analysis upon which that 
outcome is based. 
Part IV undertakes a careful, critical analysis of the rationale of the 
Vermont Supreme Court in Baker for its holding that the “Common 
Benefits” Clause requires that same-sex couples be allowed to marry, or 
to enter into equivalent legal unions. The majority analysis is internally 
self-contradictory, inconsistent with precedent, and inconsistent with the 
history and context of the origins of the “Common Benefits” Clause. 
While the majority opinion contains some eloquent passages and 
emotional rhetoric, that rhetoric is not matched by any consistent, 
credible, disciplined legal analysis. 
Part V suggests, however, that despite its analytical scantiness and 
deficiencies, Baker is likely to be the direction the movement for same-
sex marriage takes in the near future. The endorsement of some leading 
gay advocates who laud the Baker approach and who encourage the 
movement for same-sex marriage to first embrace “civil unions” or 
similar kinds of marriage-by-another-name as goals in the incremental 
 
 4. In this respect, Baker might be compared to other political decisions in which decorative 
adjectives replaced legal analysis. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 983 (1992) (Scalia J. dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
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quest for same-sex marriage is noted. The result in the recent U.S. 
Supreme court decision in Lawrence v. Texas,5 steps toward the Vermont 
system of legally recognized same-sex unions apart from but equivalent 
to marriage, while it also embraces and imitates Baker’s substitution of 
emotional rhetoric for coherent, disciplined legal analysis. 
Part VI contains some suggestions about how Baker can (and should) 
be distinguished and limited. Several reasons why Baker should not have 
significant persuasive influence are suggested. It is noted that state 
constitutional amendments may be the most prudent and effective ways 
to prevent the spread of Baker-type rulings by activist state courts. In 
conclusion, it is argued that the real issue raised by Baker concerns the 
role of the courts in creating and defining fundamental constitutional 
rights, institutions, and policy. That question goes to the very heart of the 
theory (known 225 years ago as “republican” theory) upon which the 
American experiment in self-government is predicated. 
II.  BAKER IN THE COURTS – NOTED AS A FACT OR CITED FOR 
BOILERPLATE, BUT NOT FOLLOWED IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The first clue that something may be amiss in the Baker analysis is in 
the fact that in the first 32 months after it was decided, only ten reported 
state and federal court cases cited Baker.6 While this is a respectable 
body of precedent, it is far less than the astounding volume of legal 
literature and disproportionately less than that explosion of celebratory 
literature would lead one to expect. A very quick Shepard’s search 
revealed that at least four other cases reported in the same volume of the 
Atlantic, Second reporter (volume 744) have been cited much more 
frequently than Baker has been cited. One case decided four weeks after 
Baker, but reported in the same volume, has been cited by more than 
twice as many courts as Baker has – in 20 reported cases and in at least 
five other cases with Lexis citations but without a printed reporter 
citation yet.7 Another case also decided four weeks after Baker and 
reported in the same volume has been cited in 18 other cases, not 
 
 5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6. Westlaw search in “allstates, allfeds” databases for “744 A.2d 864”, last searched August 
22, 2003. Baker has also been cited in two opinions of state attorneys general. See Marriages—
Marriage Licenses, 2000 Op. Ala. Att’y Gen. No. 129 (April 20, 2000) (concluding that if Vermont 
passed the Civil Unions bill, neither full faith and credit nor other sources of law would require that 
Vermont civil unions be recognized in Alabama), and Recognition of Vermont Same-Sex Civil 
Unions By Illinois, 2000 Op. Ill. Att’y Gen. 017 (Dec. 29, 2000) (concluding that Illinois is not 
required to recognize Vermont Civil Unions). 
 7. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717 (Pa. 2000). This Shepard’s research was last 
searched August 22, 2003. 
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counting multiple Lexis citations without printed reporter citations yet.8 
Another case decided six weeks after Baker but reported in 744 A.2d has 
been cited in 17 other cases (not counting a couple of Lexis citations 
without printed reporter citations yet).9 A Delaware case decided six 
months earlier, but reported in the same reported volume (744 A.2d), has 
been cited by at least 18 other courts.10 Thus, even compared to these 
other state court cases reported in the same volume of the Atlantic, 
Second – not to mention comparison to the decisions reported in a dozen 
other state and federal reporter series, the influence of Baker in other 
courts seems to have been rather modest, especially in comparison to the 
hype in the legal commentaries. 
Moreover, a quick search shows that several other Vermont cases 
decided the same year as Baker (1999) have been cited nearly as often as 
Baker. For example, White v. Quechee Lakes Landowners’ Ass’n., Inc.,11 
a tort case concerning indemnification, has been cited by nine other 
cases, compared to ten case citations for Baker. Likewise, Stickney v. 
Stickney,12 a case involving reduction of spousal compensation, is cited 
in eight other cases.13 Thus, for all the celebration, Baker barely stands 
out compared to several other Vermont cases decided the same year. An 
even more significant clue that Baker may not be quite the 
“heavyweight” legal decision that all of the celebrating would lead one to 
believe comes from the fact that most of the citations to Baker are to or 
for mere fact-of-existence matters, not to the court’s legal analysis. A 
review of the ten court decisions that cite Baker underscores this point. 
In Republican Party of Minn. v. White,14 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held (by a 5-4 vote) that a Minnesota prohibition on judicial candidates 
announcing their legal views is an unconstitutional violation of the 
freedom of speech. The majority opinion cited Baker in passing to 
illustrate the proposition that “[n]ot only do state-court judges possess 
the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the immense power to 
 
 8. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000). This Shepard’s research was last 
searched August 22, 2003. 
 9. Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 744 A.2d 175 (N.J. 2000). This Shepard’s research 
was last searched August 22, 2003. 
 10. Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465 (Del. 1999). This information comes from a Westlaw 
search on August 22, 2003. 
 11. 742 A.2d 734 (Vt. 1999) (decided two months before Baker). Shepard’s and Westlaw 
searches last done August 22, 2003. 
 12. 742 A.2d 1228 (Vt. 1999) (reduction of spousal maintenance) (Westlaw search August 
22, 2003). 
 13. See also Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 744 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1999) (cited in at least six other 
cases as of Westlaw search, August 22, 2003). 
 14. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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shape the States’ constitutions as well.”15 There is no discussion (much 
less endorsement) of the legal analysis in Baker. 
In Levin v. Yeshiva University,16 lesbian medical students filed suit 
under the State Human Rights Law and New York City Civil Rights Law 
against a private university whose medical school refused to permit them 
to reside in school-owned married student housing with their partners. 
Overturning in part the lower court’s grant of the university’s motion to 
dismiss, the New York Court of Appeals interpreted the New York City 
law as 
designed to secure for unmarried, committed couples the same benefits 
as those enjoyed by married persons. Thus, under the legislation, same-
sex couples who are in committed relationships would be able to secure 
housing and other benefits on the same basis as married couples . . . . 
Thus, the action should not be dismissed, and defendants should be 
given the opportunity to prove that the University’s policy “bears a 
significant relationship to a significant business objective” or that there 
is no disparate impact.17 
Following this, the court cited Baker noting that the Vermont Court had 
held that “same-sex couples were entitled to obtain the same benefits and 
protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples,” 
and that that decision had been effectuated by the enactment of the Civil 
Unions law.18 Thus, Baker was cited for the fact of the policy adopted by 
the court and implemented by the legislature. There is no analysis of the 
Baker decision itself, nor is any legal analysis in Baker cited or 
discussed. 
In Langan Est. of Spicehandler v. St Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y.,19 two 
gay men residing in New York registered their same-sex “civil union” in 
Vermont, after which one of the men was hit by an automobile in New 
York and died, allegedly as a result of improper medical treatment in a 
New York hospital. The surviving partner filed a wrongful death suit in 
New York against the hospital.20 On the cross-motions the issue was 
whether the gay couple had the status of “spouses” in Vermont, and, if 
so, whether New York’s public policy barred recognition of same-sex 
“spouses.”21 To answer the first question, the Supreme Court (trial judge) 
in Nassau County twice cited Baker to show the judicial order and 
 
 15. Id. at 784. 
 16. 730 N.Y.S.2d 15 (N.Y. 2001). 
 17. Id. at 25 (citations omitted). 
 18. Id. at 25, n.4. 
 19. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y.Sup. 2003). 
 20. Id. at 412. 
 21. Id. 
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principle which the Vermont Civil Union statute was designed to 
effectuate.22 So the citation clearly is to the fact and the policy (what the 
Vermont Supreme Court ordered, and why) of the Baker decision. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the New York court cited with 
approval the following rationale for the Baker decision: 
The past provides many instances where the law refused to see a human 
being when it should have. See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 
(concluding that African slaves and their descendants had “no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect”). The future may provide 
instances where the law will be asked to see a human when it should 
not. See, e.g., G. Smith, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of 
Biotechnology, 13 Notre Dame J. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 93, 114 (1999) 
(noting concerns that genetically engineering humans may threaten 
very nature of human individuality and identity). The challenge for 
future generations will be to define what is most essentially human. 
The extension of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge 
plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal 
protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and 
lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a 
recognition of our common humanity.23 
By holding that the New York public policy would not be offended by 
recognizing civil union partners as “spouses” for purpose of the New 
York wrongful death law, it can be inferred that the Nassau County trial 
judge in Langan endorsed and embraced this policy analysis from the 
Baker decision. However, he did not cite any other legal analysis, and 
cites Baker only for its expression of a policy in light of which a 
Vermont statute must be interpreted, with which the New York court 
impliedly agreed and found not to violate New York public policy. 
Moreover, the Baker quote used in Langan primarily expressed a public 
policy conclusion based upon a priori value or opinion. It is only 
peripherally “legal” analysis. 
In Goodridge v . Dep’t. of Pub. Health,24 a Massachusetts trial court 
rejected the claim of seven same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses, 
 
 22. Id. at 415, 416-17. 
 23. Id. at 417 (quoting Baker, 744 A.2d at 864). This “common humanity” language is the 
most quoted language from Baker, fully quoted at least 26 times in the law reviews (and quoted in 
one of the ten cases). 
 24. 14 Mass.L.Rptr. 591, 2002 WL 1299135 (Mass. Super. 2002), rev’d, Goodridge v. Dep’t 
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded 
that the Commonwealth had failed to articulate a rational basis for denying civil marriage to 
same-sex couples, that the Massachusetts Constitution “affirms the dignity and equality of all 
individuals,” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948, and “forbids the creation of second-class citizens,” id., 
and that in “[l]imiting the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex 
couples,” id. at 968, Massachusetts marriage licensing law, “violate[d] the basic premises of 
individual liberty and equality under law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.” Id. Three 
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and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Baker is 
cited three times. The first two references were citations to the many 
courts that “have interpreted their marriage statutes to apply only to one 
man and one woman.”25 The other reference noted that the Baker 
decision was based solely on the “Common Benefits” Clause of the 
Vermont Constitution, and that there was no analogous provision in the 
Massachusetts Constitution.26 The Massachusetts court made no 
reference to any legal analysis of the Baker decision. 
In Rosengarten v. Downes,27 the Connecticut Court of Appeals 
affirmed a lower court dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of 
a suit for dissolution filed by a party to a Vermont same-sex civil union. 
The plaintiff argued that by allowing same-sex partners to adopt, the 
Connecticut legislature had shown a willingness to recognize civil 
unions, just as the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker had relied on a 
similar change in Vermont adoption law to justify its decision. The 
Connecticut court disagreed, noting that the legislative history clearly 
showed “that a number of legislators were opposed to adoption of this 
legislation if it were to be used later in any way as a wedge by appellate 
or trial courts to require recognition of civil unions in Connecticut in the 
manner they ascribed to the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker.”28 This 
concern had ample justification, because the Baker court had arrived at 
its decision by using amendments to adoption laws “as a wedge” to show 
“there was no proper governmental purpose under the common benefits 
clause of the Vermont constitution to restrict marriage to unions between 
a man and a woman.”29 Thus, the Rosengarten case did cite one point of 
legal analysis in the Baker decision, but it explicitly declines to follow 
that rationale because the Connecticut legislature expressly rejected the 
connection between adoption and same-sex unions that the Baker court 
had inferred and relied upon.30 
 
months later, in In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004), the same 
court rendered an “advisory opinion” to the state Senate indicating that creation of Vermont-style 
Civil Unions would also violate the Massachusetts Constitution because 
[t]he same defects of rationality evident in the marriage ban considered in Goodridge are 
evident in, if not exaggerated by, Senate No. 2175 [the proposed Civil Union bill] . . . . 
Because the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil 
marriage, it continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status . . . . The history 
of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal. 
802 N.E.2d at 569. 
 25. Goodridge, 14 Mass.L.Rptr. at *2, *3. 
 26. Id. at *6. 
 27. 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002). 
 28. Id. at 181. 
 29. Id. 
 30. The Connecticut court may have signaled its own disapproval of the Baker logic on this 
point when it put “reality” in quotes: “After discussing what it termed the ‘reality’ that some persons 
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The lack of use of the legal analysis in Baker is even more startling 
in the subsequent references to Baker in decisions of the Vermont 
Supreme Court. Baker was cited only five times in reported Vermont 
decisions (printed in the Atlantic, Second, reporter series) in the first 32 
months after the case was decided, and for innocuous points. 
In two cases Baker is cited for the principle of statutory construction 
that courts must discern and follow legislative intent. In Cantin v. 
Young,31 the plaintiff moved for modification of child support to include 
her former husband’s workers’ compensation benefits as income in 
determining the guideline amount. The court cited Baker when noting 
“[o]ur intent in construing a statutory provision is to discern the intent of 
the Legislature.”32 There is no other discussion or analysis of the Baker 
decision itself. Similarly, in Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co.,33 insured parties 
brought declaratory judgment actions against their automobile insurers 
and self-insured employer to recover underinsured motorist benefits. The 
court noted, 
In construing a statutory provision, our paramount goal is to discern 
and implement the intent of the Legislature. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 
864, 868 (1999) . . . . When the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning 
expressed by that language. Baker, 744 A.2d at 868.34 
There is no further discussion or analysis of the Baker decision itself. 
These cases reveal that the one legal holding in Baker that has actually 
been cited and used by other courts comes from the part of the opinion 
that interpreted the Vermont marriage statute as not allowing same-sex 
couples to marry. 
In Daye v. State of Vermont,35 a prisoner advocacy group filed suit 
challenging the validity of contracts for transfer of Vermont prisoners to 
prisons in other states alleging violations of the Interstate Corrections 
Compact and of the Vermont Constitution’s “visible punishments” 
clause. The trial court dismissed for lack of standing.36 The Vermont 
Supreme Court affirmed and also noted that even if the parties had 
standing, their claims would fail.37 As to the “visible punishments” 
 
in same-sex relationships were conceiving children by artificial means, the Vermont court so used 
the enactment by the Vermont legislature of that change in the law . . . .” Id. 
 31. 770 A.2d 449 (Vt. 2000). 
 32. Id. at 451 (citing Baker, 744 A.2d at 868). 
 33. 819 A.2d 727 (Vt. 2003). 
 34. Id. at 730. 
 35. 769 A.2d 630 (Vt. 2000). 
 36. Id. at 632. 
 37. Id. As to the ICC claims, the court held that the Corrections Commissioner had authority 
to enter into a transfer agreement with a New Jersey County (not just a state), to allow Virginia 
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provision, the court reviewed the history of that provision of the state 
constitution and quoted Baker for the propositions that “our state 
constitution provides the ‘first and primary safeguard of the rights and 
liberties of all Vermonters,’” and that “‘the motivating ideal of the 
framers’ must continually inform our analysis of contemporary issues.”38 
Applying that standard, the court concluded that “the fundamental 
purpose—the ‘motivating ideal’—of the framers was to replace brutal 
punishments with visible labor for the people to observe and ‘and be 
instructed by’ is largely persuasive.39 What plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate is any violation of that motivating ideal.”40 Baker was cited 
once solely for historical fact to provide the “primary safeguard” context 
for the issue before the court.41 
In Brady v. Dean,42 several members of Vermont House of 
Representatives, three town clerks, and some taxpayers filed suit against 
the governor of Vermont and other state officials to enjoin 
implementation of same-sex civil union law. The court referred to Baker 
when explaining the origins of the civil union law.43 There was no 
discussion or analysis of the Baker decision itself. However, the Brady 
case is worth mentioning further because it seems to support the idea that 
Baker is sui generis. 
In Brady the plaintiffs challenged the enactment of the Vermont 
Civil Union law because of, inter alia, alleged serious misconduct by 
fourteen legislators that voted for the civil union law. Their allegations, 
which were accepted at face value for purposes of the motion, were 
that fourteen members of the [Vermont] House of Representatives 
participated in a “dollar-a-question” betting pool in connection with a 
preliminary vote on the civil unions bill. The money went to the 
participant coming closest to predicting the number of “yes” votes. The 
vote was seventy-six to sixty-nine in favor of having the bill read a 
third time. All fourteen participants in the pool voted “yes.”44 
The Speaker of the House expressed disapproval but did not disqualify 
the fourteen nor did any of them disqualify themselves, nor was the 
 
prison officials to select the prison where the Vermont prisoners would be kept, and to apply stricter 
visitation rules than apply in Vermont prisons. Id. at 633-36. 
 38. Id. at 638 (quoting Baker, 744 A.2d at 870). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 790 A.2d 428 (Vt. 2001). See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil 
Unions: Some Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 401, 426-428 
(2002). 
 43. Id. at 429. 
 44. Id. 
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legislative vote retaken or reconsidered.45 Plaintiffs alleged violation of 
state constitutional prohibition on accepting “any fee or reward” for 
advocating a bill, from “tak[ing] greater fees than the law allows,” the 
“Common Benefits” Clause (basis for the Baker ruling), and statutes 
criminalizing the “running of lotteries, games of chance and 
bookmaking.”46 The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing, 
the issue was a political issue, and separation of powers would prevent 
the court from adjudicating those claims.47 
The Vermont Supreme Court, which in Baker had effectively 
ordered the state legislature to legalize same-sex marriage or create an 
equivalent legal union for same-sex couples, affirmed on the ground that 
plaintiffs lacked standing because of the principle of judicial 
noninterference with legislative functions and political questions.48 The 
court said: “The prudent exercise of judicial self-restraint and deference 
to the independence of a coordinate governmental branch”49 prevented 
the court from investigating charges that the democratic process was 
compromised by the unethical conduct, and that “a proper regard for the 
independence of the Legislature”50 required the court to ignore the 
charges because “no branch [may] usurp the ‘core functions’ . . . or 
impair the ‘independent institutional integrity’ of another.”51 
Brady revealed behavior that not only indicts the leaders of the 
Vermont legislature who simply looked the other way and failed to take 
any action to rectify the abuse of legislative process, but it revealed the 
double-standard of the Vermont Supreme Court which brushed aside the 
challenges to the alleged legislative corruption. One wonders why the 
court’s commitment to “the constitutional imperative to afford all 
Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of the law,”52 
did not extend to protecting the rights of opponents of the court’s own 
favored policy, or to enforcing the anti-gambling and legislative integrity 
laws against legislators who support that judicially-preferred policy. In 
Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court ended its landmark decision 
 
 45. Id. at 430 (“[Speaker] Metzger stated that he was ‘appalled’ and ‘ashamed’ by the 
conduct of the participants and ‘concerned [about] the impact on the final vote’ but otherwise no 
objection . . .”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 429. 
 48. The town clerks asserted that it violated their religious liberty to be required to register 
same-sex civil unions. The trial court rejected this claim on the merits, and the supreme court agreed 
that as the civil union law allowed assistants to issue the civil union license, the religious liberty of 
the town clerks was adequately accommodated. Id. at 434-35. 
 49. Id. at 431. 
 50. Id. at 432. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. 
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mandating equal legal status and benefits for same-sex couples with the 
ringing declaration: “The extension of the Common Benefits Clause to 
acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, 
than legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an 
intimate and lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and 
done, a recognition of our common humanity.”53 Yet Brady could be 
read as demonstrating that legislators who cooperate to implement 
controversial judicial preferences in Vermont are not held to the common 
standards applicable to mere “common humanity.”54 At the very least, 
Brady suggests that the Baker decision really is sui generis. 
The fifth reported Vermont case to cite Baker involved the 
“Common Benefits” Clause, the basis for the Baker ruling, and brings us 
to consider the impact of Baker in Vermont upon interpretation of that 
clause of the Vermont Constitution. The Clause provides: “That 
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for 
the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or 
set of persons, who are a part only of that community . . . .”55 In the first 
32 months since Baker was decided, the Vermont Supreme Court 
interpreted the “Common Benefits” clause in only one case.56 It cited 
Baker in that case, but, in stark contrast to Baker, it declined to interfere 
with or overrule the legislative policy, expressing strong deference to the 
legislature (ironically quoting Baker for that principle). In OMYA, Inc. v. 
Town of Middlebury,57 the owner of a quarry appealed the decision of the 
Vermont Environmental Board rejecting its request to double the number 
 
 53. Id at 889. 
 54. Id. 
 55. VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 7. While the provision refers to “the common benefit . . . of the 
people” (singular) the Vermont Supreme Court calls this the “Common Benefits Clause” (plural), 
and so that grammatically questionable form is used herein. 
 56. In another case, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to reach the “Common Benefits” 
Clause issue because the appellant had not raised the issue in the trial court. In re Picket Fence 
Preview, 795 A.2d 1242 (Vt. 2002) (affirming Vermont Tax Commissioner and Superior Court 
determination that a for-sale-by-owner guide was not exempt from the state use tax as a 
“newspaper,” and rejecting the taxpayer’s federal equal protection and free speech claims, and 
declining to reach the “Common Benefits” Clause and other Vermont Constitution claims). In a 
second case, Town of Killington v. State, 776 A.2d 395, 397 (Vt. 2001), the “Common Benefits” 
Clause is mentioned in passing in an explanation of the factual background of a dispute over 
interpretation of a tax statute which had been enacted in response to a decision by the Vermont 
Supreme Court interpreting the “Common Benefits” Clause as requiring equalization of education 
spending among different Vermont towns. The mention of the “Common Benefits” Clause was 
purely for historical case context and did not bear upon the issue, and interpretation of statute, which 
turned on effectuating the intent of the legislature, the court rejecting the Town’s interpretation and 
accepting the state’s. Id. at 400-01. Likewise, in Brady, 790 A.2d 428, the Vermont Supreme Court 
declined to reach the merits of a “Common Benefits” Clause claim challenging legislative betting on 
the outcome of the Civil Union bill. 
 57. 758 A.2d 777 (Vt. 2000). 
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of round trips the quarry’s trucks could make through a small village 
located between the quarry and the quarry’s processing plant.58 After 
brushing aside other constitutional claims,59 the Vermont Supreme Court 
considered the quarry operator’s argument that the Board’s decision 
violated the “Common Benefits” Clause of the Vermont Constitution 
because other quarry operators were not similarly restricted under the 
state’s land use law.60 The court cited three cases, including Baker, to 
support the proposition that “the legislature may choose to address 
problems incrementally.”61 The court quoted dicta from Baker to make 
the point that: “It is . . . well settled that statutes are not necessarily 
unconstitutional because they fail to extend legal protection to all who 
are similarly situated.”62 The court reasoned that because the land use 
law requiring permits “does not apply to all in-state developments or 
out-of-state enterprises does not render it constitutionally infirm.”63 The 
quarry cited cases where increased automobile traffic had been approved 
by the Board, but the court distinguished the environmental impact of 
increased car traffic from increased truck traffic. Since the quarry had not 
shown that the Board acted arbitrarily or fancifully, the court upheld the 
Board decision.64 Thus, the OMYA court cited Baker for a principle that 
had been noted in dicta (but not followed) in Baker, a principle used to 
uphold legislation. OMYA did not cite Baker for the holding of Baker, or 
for the interpretation of the “Common Benefits” Clause that overcame or 
circumvented the deference to legislation principle, or for the rationale or 
logic behind that interpretation in Baker. Interestingly, the court in 
OMYA did not even try to distinguish the interpretation of the “Common 
Benefits” Clause in Baker. That is significant, for if the Baker standard 
of interpretation of the “Common Benefits” Clause had been applied in 
OMYA, it seems that it would have led the court to overturn the decision 
of the Environmental Board. There certainly is a discrepancy between 
the outcome in Baker and in OMYA insofar as upholding legislation that 
has disparate impact upon separate groups, differentially affecting the 
rights enjoyed by one class of persons. So the failure to fully distinguish 
 
 58. The quarry had permission to make 85 round trips through Brandon per day; it sought 
permission to make 170 round trips; the Environmental Board granted permission to make 115 
roundtrips per day. Id. at 779. 
 59. The Vermont Supreme Court first rejected OMYA’s claim that the decision exceeded the 
jurisdiction and authority of the Board, id. at 779-80; violated substantive due process, id. at 780; 
and constituted an impermissible moratorium. Id. 
 60. Id. at 780. 
 61. Id. at 781. The holding in Baker would seem to contradict this principle. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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or reconcile the cases is noteworthy. It suggests that the Vermont 
Supreme Court considers Baker to have established a rule or principle 
that is not of general applicability. It is sui generis. And as such, it is 
self-contradictory. As it seems to have been applied by the Vermont 
Supreme Court, the Baker interpretation of the Vermont “Common 
Benefits” Clause (creating a special exception to the “Common Benefits” 
Clause interpretation for same-sex couples only) seems to violate the 
Baker commonality principle. 
By comparison, in the three years before Baker was decided, the 
Vermont Supreme Court interpreted the “Common Benefits” Clause in 
four cases.65 In three of the four cases, the “Common Benefits” Clause 
claim was rejected. In L’Esperance v. Town of Charlotte,66 Justice 
Dooley, writing for the court, held that a trial court ruling requiring the 
selectmen of a town to renew a lease for lakefront property for the rent 
set in the original lease did not violate the “Common Benefits” Clause 
because it provided the town with “adequate and reasonable benefits.”67 
Parker v. Gorczyk,68 held that a policy that would make prisoners 
convicted of violent felonies ineligible for furlough until the expiration 
of their minimum sentences does not violate state due process of equal 
protection (“Common Benefits” Clause) with only passing reference to 
the Clause, but incorporating much due process analysis. In Wood v. 
Fletcher Allen Health Care,69 the court, per Justice Dooley, rejected a 
“Common Benefits” Clause claim by the employer of a pregnant woman 
allowed disability benefits. “The ‘inquiry under Article 7 is whether the 
statute is reasonably related to the promotion of a valid public 
purpose.’”70 
In one case, however, the “Common Benefits” Clause claim was 
accepted and resulted in a significant change in state education funding 
policy. In Brigham v. State,71 decided more than two years before Baker, 
 
 65. The court has noted, but avoided interpreting, the “Common Benefits” Clause in several 
other cases. See In re A.J., 733 A.2d 36 (Vt. 1999) (subordinating “Common Benefits” Clause 
claims to federal Equal Protection claims—which were rejected—where a mother was challenging 
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act exclusion of unrecognized tribes); Mello v. Cohen, 724 A.2d 
471, 473 (Vt. 1998) (noting but not evaluating plaintiff’s claim that an expert testimony requirement 
violated several provisions including the “Common Benefits” Clause); Tarrant v. Dep’t of Taxes, 
733 A.2d 733, 747 (Vt. 1999) (holding that taxpayer is entitled to tax credit for pro rata share of 
taxes paid by their Subchapter S corporation on statutory grounds, dissenting opinion disagrees and 
summarily concludes that claim that tax rule violates, inter alia, the “Common Benefits” Clause is 
without merit). 
 66. 704 A.2d 760 (Vt. 1997). 
 67. Id. at 763. 
 68. 744 A.2d 410 (Vt. 1999). 
 69. 739 A.2d 1201 (Vt. 1999). 
 70. Id. at 1207 (quoting MacCallum v. Seymour’s Adm’r, 686 A.2d 935, 937 (Vt. 1996)). 
 71. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). See infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
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the court held that the state scheme for funding public education which 
resulted in huge disparities in per-pupil educational spending (ranging 
from $2979 to $7726) fell “well short of achieving reasonable 
educational equality of opportunity,” and violated the “Common 
Benefits” Clause and the “Education and Virtue” Clause of the Vermont 
Constitution.72 
Given the small number of “Common Benefits” Clause cases and the 
relatively short period of time, it is not possible to make a definitive 
statement about the impact of Baker on Vermont “Common Benefits” 
Clause jurisprudence. But this much can be said: the unique construction 
of the “Common Benefits” Clause in Baker and the court’s creative 
rationale for that interpretation have not been used, much less followed, 
in any reported cases decided in Vermont in the 32 months since Baker 
was decided. Only one case cites Baker for any constitutional analysis, 
and that is for a proposition relating to a generic principle concerning the 
importance of finding and following the original intent and purpose of 
the founders. The radical construction of the “Common Benefits” Clause 
in Baker appears to be sui generis in Vermont so far. 
Thus, courts in other jurisdictions have cited Baker for the fact of its 
existence and the fact of its judgment. While a few hint approval, there 
has been only one clear endorsement of the judgment. Most significantly, 
courts in other jurisdictions have not cited, followed, or used the legal 
rationale at the core of Baker—the interpretation of equality principles—
at all. The Baker interpretation has been noted as a matter of fact, but has 
not been followed in equality cases in other jurisdictions, and the logic 
and rationale of Baker have not been imitated or followed at all in 
interpreting equality principles. Even in Vermont, Baker has been cited 
only for routine statutory interpretation principles and for the principle 
that finding the original intent and purpose of the founders is important 
in interpreting the state constitution. As to the scope and meaning and 
application of the “Common Benefits” Clause, nearly three years after its 
sensational decision, Baker remains sui generis even in the Vermont 
Supreme Court. 
Thus, of the ten cases that cited Baker, three cite Baker for the 
principles of statutory interpretation it stated. Three cite Baker solely or 
primarily for the fact of the policy that was adopted, not to follow or 
endorse it but to note that it was adopted. As for the other cases, one 
distinguishes the “Common Benefits” Clause basis of Baker, one 
distinguishes Baker’s interpretation of the implication of the Vermont 
adoption statute to permit same-sex couples to adopt, one cites Baker to 
 
 72. Id. at 397. 
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explain the factual context in which the other case arose, one cites Baker 
for the general policy of giving liberal interpretation to the Vermont 
Constitution, and one cites Baker for the proposition of the importance of 
deferring to the legislature. 
III.  THE SILENCE IN THE CELEBRATION—WHAT THE LEGAL 
LITERATURE DOES NOT SAY ABOUT BAKER 
The articles reviewed by my research assistant, Justin Starr, in 
Appendix A, total 266 pieces, and they are categorized into five 
categories. One hundred thirty-nine (139) articles are positive—
supportive of Baker. Another twenty-eight (28) articles support Baker as 
a step in the right direction but are critical of the court for not going far 
enough, for allowing the creation of a separate-but-equal regime and not 
ordering the outright legalization of same-sex marriage. That makes a 
total of 167 articles that are positive about Baker. Seventy-one (71) other 
articles took a neutral position, describing and reporting but neither 
endorsing nor criticizing the decision. Twenty-seven (27) articles were 
negative—critical of some aspect of the Baker decision; the most 
common criticism was for disregarding, supplanting or usurping, the role 
of the legislature, that is, for judicial legislation. Finally, one article 
challenged the notion that Baker was positive, but could not be called 
neutral or negative because the article author argued that marriage is an 
inherently dysfunctional institution, and called for abolition of marriage 
altogether. 
While most law review writing about recent cases focuses on 
understanding, explaining and either criticizing or supporting the legal 
analysis of the court, a different pattern characterizes most of the law 
review writing about Baker. Virtually all of the legal writing about Baker 
focuses on the result, and largely ignores the legal analysis. The legal 
literature supportive of Baker tends to be celebratory rather than 
analytical. At first blush, one might brush aside that phenomenon. After 
all, before Baker not a single American state accorded same-sex couples 
any status or legal relationship rights significantly comparable to 
marriage,73 but Baker declared that same-sex couples had a constitutional 
 
 73. Two years before the Baker decision, the Hawaii legislature enacted a law allowing any 
two persons unable to marry to register as “reciprocal beneficiaries.” HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
431:10-234 (Michie 2001). However, that law emphasizes that the relationship is not equal to or 
comparable to marriage, nor was it designed for or limited to same-sex couples. See Craig W. 
Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a ‘Simulacrum of 
Marriage’, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1739-40 (1998) (“Underscoring that the status is not meant 
to confer special symbolic recognition on gay relationships, the law specifies that it is as open to ‘a 
widowed mother and her unmarried son’ as to ‘two individuals who are of the same gender.’”). 
Compared to civil unions, relatively few benefits are conferred upon Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries, 
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right under the Vermont Constitution to the same or equivalent legal 
status and benefits as married couples. So, some celebration is to be 
expected. However, it is not the presence of celebratory writing about 
Baker that is curious; it is the absence of analytical writing. Indeed, given 
the precedential potential of the ground-breaking decision, one would 
expect enthusiasts of same-sex unions to have produced a geyser of legal 
analysis devotedly dissecting the court’s rationale in delicious detail, 
enthusiastically elucidating the logic of the court’s interpretation of the 
Vermont Constitution, and elaborately explaining why the analysis of the 
Court in Baker is irrefutable. In context, the paucity of reference to the 
Vermont Supreme Court’s legal analysis in the voluminous writing 
endorsing Baker seems curious. 
Most of the supportive law review articles on Baker do not attempt 
to defend the decision—they fete, celebrate, and lionize Baker but they 
do not examine or analyze. Greg Johnson sets the tone in his article, In 
Praise of Civil Unions: “Let us celebrate Vermont! Let us praise civil 
unions!”74 Several candidly (or tacitly) admit that Baker does not contain 
significant legal analysis. Michael Mello, for example, states that the 
Baker opinion “did not contain civil rights doctrine.”75 Rather, they 
frequently direct the focus of consideration of Baker to the importance of 
larger, non-technical, non-analytical factors. Beth Robinson, one of the 
plaintiff’s attorneys in Baker, wrote: “I think some of the most valuable 
lessons we, as lawyers, can draw from the Vermont experience aren’t 
strictly legal, or academic, and can’t be gleaned by simply reading the 
Baker v. State decision or reviewing the civil union law.”76 The negative 
pregnant in that statement is significant. Some articles praise the Baker 
court for its political wisdom—advancing the cause of same-sex 
marriage agenda without going so far as to cause an overwhelming 
backlash. For example, William Eskridge makes this point, describing 
what he calls the “nightmare scenario.” 
Legislative adoption of same-sex marriage might have polarized the 
electorate and yielded a traditionalist backlash even more than civil 
unions have done. In that event, not only would the next legislature and 
 
and very few same-sex (or other) couples have registered as reciprocal beneficiaries. Greg Johnson, 
In Praise of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315, 334 n.142 (2002) (only 592 couples registered as 
Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries in the first four years, compared to 2,479 couples who registered for 
Vermont civil unions in the first year, and Professor Johnson calls the Hawaii reciprocal beneficiary 
law “a stigmatizing law.”) 
 74. Johnson, supra note 73. 
 75. Michael Mello, For Today, I’m Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-sex Marriage in 
Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 172 (2000). 
 76. Beth Robinson, The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex Couples: Lessons from Vermont, 11 
SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 237, 237 (2001). 
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governor have been able to repeal the civil unions law, but they might 
have had enough votes to propose a constitutional amendment 
overriding Baker. In this nightmare scenario, pushing for option A, the 
best choice, would not only have resulted in option C, the worst choice, 
but would have run the risk of hard-wiring option C into Vermont 
constitutional law. 
The nightmare scenario is also the reason the Vermont Supreme Court 
pulled its punches in Baker. The justices on that court were aware of 
the fate of earlier same-sex marriage rulings in other states.77 
About ten percent (10%) of the articles listed in Appendix A criticize 
Baker and portray it as a negative decision. Most of the criticisms of 
Baker in the law review literature focus on the judicial activism of the 
court. They assert that the court usurped a function that is not judicial, 
but either legislative or constitutive (to create or amend the 
constitution).78 
IV.  A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN BAKER 
The history of how commentators who support Baker for policy 
reasons have been silent about the legal reasoning, and of how other 
courts and even the Vermont Supreme Court in other cases have largely 
ignored the crucial legal reasoning in Baker invites a critical analysis of 
the Baker opinion. 
The Vermont Supreme Court issued three opinions in Baker totaling 
46 pages in volume 744 of the Atlantic, Second reporter.79 The majority 
opinion by Chief Justice Jeffrey L. Amestoy represented the views of 
three justices completely, and of two other justices partially. Justice John 
A. Dooley’s concurring opinion rejected the court’s constitutional 
analysis, but reached the same conclusion by another approach. Justice 
Denise R. Johnson’s separate opinion concurred in the court’s 
constitutional analysis, suggesting an additional rationale, and dissented 
 
 77. William N. Eskridge, Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil 
Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 873-74 (2001). See also, Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue 
of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L. REV. 93, 101 (2000)(“This recent history did not go unnoticed by the 
Baker court. Chief Justice Amestoy’s opinion for the majority expressly acknowledged the ‘political 
cauldron of public debate’ that had produced state constitutional amendment’s in Alaska and 
Hawaii . . . .”). 
 78. See, e.g., Lino Graglia, Single-Sex “Marriage”: The Role of the Courts, 2001 BYU L. 
REV. 1013, 1014 (2001); Francis Cardinal George, O.M.I., Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
1, 16 (2003); Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 19, 26 
(2003). 
 79. The caption is at 744 A.2d 864, but the majority opinion begins on page 867 and ends on 
page 889; Justice Dooley’s opinion runs from 889-897; and Justice Johnson’s opinion runs from 
897-912. 
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from the remedy part of the majority opinion. Only one of the opinions, 
Justice Dooley’s, contains sustained, credible, legal analysis. 
The majority opinion contains four main parts, (a) analyzing the 
statutory question, (b) determining the constitutional standard, (c) 
applying the constitutional standard, and (d) deciding the appropriate 
remedy. Three of them are seriously defective in legal analysis. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
The only part of the majority opinion that was supported 
unanimously by all five justices (apart from the mandate reversing the 
lower court) was the statutory analysis. Like every other court in the 
country that has faced similar statutory claims,80 the Vermont Supreme 
Court rejected the assertion that the state marriage statute could be 
construed to require marriage license officials to allow same-sex couples 
to marry.81 The court noted that the objective in deciding contested 
statutory construction is “to discern the legislative intent,” and to do that 
the court relied “on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words . . . .”82 
Referring to dictionaries,83 “the understanding of the term [that] is well-
rooted in Vermont common law,”84 and the meaning indicated by 
numerous related statutes,85 the court held that “the evidence 
demonstrates a clear legislative assumption that marriage under our 
statutory scheme consists of a union between a man and a woman.”86 
That clear and particular legislative intent also distinguished a case cited 
by plaintiffs in which the court had interpreted the term “spouse” in an 
adoption statute to include same-sex partners.87 
The five-paragraph statutory interpretation is simple, 
straightforward, and unremarkable. It exemplifies ordinary, credible, 
legal analysis, correctly states established legal principles, cites 
 
 80. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Weaver v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 558 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ala. 1983); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Al. 
Super. Ct. 1998); Dean v. Dist. of Colum., 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 
(Haw. 1993); In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); Jennings v. Jennings, 315 
A.2d 816 (Md. Ct. App. 1974). See also, Robin Cheryl Miller & Jason Binimow, Marriage Between 
Persons of Same-Sex: United States and Canadian Cases, 2003 A.L.R. FED. 2 (2003) (listing cases 
interpreting state statutes to prevent same-sex marriages in Section 3). 
 81. Baker, 744 A.2d at 869. 
 82. Id. at 868. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 868-69. 
 86. Id. at 869. 
 87. In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993), distinguished in Baker at 744 A.2d at 869 
because the B.L.V.B. case involved “a narrow statutory exception” which had to be interpreted 
broadly to effectuate what the court decided was the legislature’s real “intent and spirit.” Id. 
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precedents that actually support those principles, and applies those 
principles in a direct, coherent fashion. This analytical approach stands in 
stark contrast to the kind and quality of analysis in the remaining sections 
of the majority opinion (and most of Justice Johnson’s opinion). As 
noted above, the court’s summary statements of basic principles of 
statutory construction are the legal principles for which Baker is most 
frequently cited.88 
B. Standard of Review Under the “Common Benefits” Clause 
The court’s analysis of the constitutional issues, by contrast, fills 
seventeen (17) pages. The ultimate constitutional issue is whether 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage and its many benefits violates 
Vermont’s “counterpart” to the federal Equal Protection Clause, the 
“Common Benefits” Clause. The court asserted that the “Common 
Benefits” Clause predates, is independent from, and reflects somewhat 
different values than (is “not a mere reflection of”) the federal 
Constitution’s equality rule.89 From the outset, the court also focuses on 
the state’s claim that marriage links procreation and childrearing, and the 
plaintiffs’ challenge to it.90 
In the section on “Historical Development,”91 the court thoroughly 
reviewed the standards and tests under the “Common Benefits” Clause, 
and how they differ from federal Equal Protection standards and 
analysis, noting that Vermont cases apply a “more stringent” 
reasonableness inquiry than federal “rational basis” cases92 and “have 
been less than consistent in their application” of the “Common Benefits” 
Clause jurisprudence.93 The court concluded that “[t]he rigid categories 
utilized . . . under the Fourteenth Amendment [Equal Protection analysis] 
find no support in our early case law and, while routinely cited, are often 
effectively ignored in our more recent cases.”94 Denial of public benefits 
 
 88. See infra Section II. 
 89. Baker, 744 A.2d at 870. 
 90. Id. (noting plaintiff’s claim that: 
the large number of married couples without children, and the increasing incidence of 
same-sex couples with children, undermines the State’s rationale [that marriage links 
procreation and child rearing]. They note that Vermont law affirmatively guarantees the 
right to adopt and raise children regardless of the sex of the parents . . . and challenge the 
logic of the legislative scheme that recognizes the rights of same-sex partners as parents, 
yet denies them—and their children—the same security as spouses.) 
 91. Id. at 870-73. 
 92. Id. at 872. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 873. 
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to some persons must be justified under the “Common Benefits” Clause 
by “an appropriate and overriding public interest.”95 
The review of the Vermont “Common Benefits” Clause 
jurisprudence is informative and directive. Many cases are cited and 
discussed. However, by contrast, the asserted reasons for rejecting a 
structured, standard, multi-tiered approach are weak and unpersuasive.96 
More importantly, the articulated basis for adopting the new “balancing” 
approach for “Common Benefits” Clause analysis is utterly without 
support. The court cites one case, State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc.,97 
which it reads as departing from the traditional, structured “Common 
Benefits” Clause analysis, and adopting a pure “balancing” approach.98 
But closer examination of both Ludlow and of the cases decided during 
more than seventeen years between Ludlow and Baker contradicts the 
Baker court’s reading of Ludlow. First, nothing in Ludlow supports the 
claim that the Vermont Supreme Court in that case changed the standard 
of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis. In Ludlow, the court invalidated 
a Sunday closing law that applied only to large retailers, but not to small 
retailers, finding the law to give an improper preference to small 
businesses unrelated to any non-preferential, legitimate legislative 
purpose.99 The Ludlow court quoted, but did not rest upon, a case in 
which the New Jersey Supreme Court had invalidated a Sunday closing 
law applicable to some specific goods, but not applicable to many others 
because, regardless of “rational basis” it violated “common sense”100 (a 
rudder-less standard somewhat akin to that used in Baker). The Ludlow 
court found “the core purpose” of the selective Sunday closing law 
“confirmed by legislative language is the special protection of the 
economic health of small, locally owned, retail stores” which could “be 
achieved without this particular” discrimination between large and small 
businesses.101 While distinguishing the federalism constraints upon 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. For example, the court’s reliance on the fact that the use of different categories linked to 
different (sliding scale) standards of Equal Protection (or “Common Benefits” Clause) analysis 
“find[s] no support in our early case law” to justify rejection of such categories and different 
standards of review is unpersuasive. Id. The use of different categories and standards is a relatively 
new development in the history of federal Equal Protection jurisprudence as well as in Vermont 
“Common Benefits” Clause jurisprudence; that structured (multi-tiered) approach blossomed in 
federal jurisprudence primarily in the last half of the twentieth century. See, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 999-1001 (1978). So the absence of such analysis in the “early 
case law” of Vermont is hardly surprising. 
 97. 448 A.2d 791 (1982). 
 98. Baker, 744 A.2d at 871-73. 
 99. Ludlow, 448 A.2d at 794-96. (“The purpose of the preferential legislation must be to 
further a goal independent of the preference awarded . . . .”). Id. at 795. 
 100. Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 390 A.2d 606, 615-16 (N.J. 1978). 
 101. Ludlow, 448 A.2d at 796. 
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federal Equal Protection analysis from the local expertise of state 
courts,102 Ludlow did not purport to modify the standard of analysis 
under the “Common Benefits” Clause, but simply summarized and 
restated it. The only reference to balance was when the court noted: 
Almost all regulatory legislation, particularly when the concern is 
economic, tends to be uneven in its impact. Such inequalities are not 
fatal with respect to constitutional standards if the underlying policy 
supporting the regulation is a compelling one, and the unbalanced 
impact is, as a practical matter, a necessary consequence of the most 
reasonable way of implementing that policy.103 
This sole reference to “balance” is made in connection with the well-
known standard of “compelling interest” and classification “necessary” 
to implement that interest, a standard that has been around in Vermont 
since at least 1939 when the Vermont Supreme Court admitted that under 
the “Common Benefits” Clause “it has been repeatedly recognized that in 
the exercise of the police power of the State, a legislative classification 
that is not arbitrary or irrational may be established.”104 The “unbalanced 
impact” refers to the disparate impact on different groups, not the court’s 
analytical test. Ludlow simply does not adopt or support the malleable 
“balancing” standard of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis utilized by 
the court in Baker to hold that the Vermont marriage law allowing only 
male-female couples to marry was unconstitutional. 
Moreover, contrary to the Baker majority’s indication,105 none of the 
twenty cases that cited Ludlow during the intervening twenty-plus years, 
except Baker, read Ludlow as signaling a change in the standard of 
“Common Benefits” Clause analysis, or for adoption of a “balancing” 
test.106 Rather, the subsequent decisions cited Ludlow often for the 
 
 102. Id. at 795. 
 103. Id. at 793 (citing State v. Auclair, 4 A.2d 107, 113 (1939). 
 104. Auclair, 4 A.2d at 113. 
 105. Baker, 744 A.2d at 873. (“The balancing approach utilized in Ludlow and implicit in our 
recent decisions . . . .”). (emphasis added). 
 106. J.L. v. Miller, 817 A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2002) (Ludlow shows that “[c]ourts have a duty to 
refrain from interfering with the sovereign powers of the legislature as allocated by the state 
constitution.”); In re Reapportionment, 624 A.2d 323, 337 (Vt. 1993) (Ludlow held that preferential 
legislation must further a goal independent of the preference awarded); Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 599 
A.2d 1371, 1373 (Vt. 1991) (Ludlow established that “the Vermont Constitution is freestanding and 
may require this Court to examine more closely distinctions drawn by state government than would 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, 589 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Vt. 1990) 
(Ludlow shows that legislation that prefers one group above another may be unconstitutional); 
Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d 455, 459 (Vt. 1989) (summarizing holding of Ludlow as selective 
Sunday closing law “did not serve ‘an appropriate and overriding public interest,’ nor did the State 
establish that the infringement of the rights of the citizens was merely incidental and that the 
objectives of the law could be reached in no other way”) and id. at 460 (Ludlow stated that “virtually 
all regulatory statutes have disparate effects on various sectors of the public”); State v. Saari, 568 
A.2d 344, 348 (Vt. 1989) (Ludlow indicated that regulatory legislation is not unconstitutional where 
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proposition that the purpose of the “Common Benefits” Clause is to 
avoid preference for one group,107 for the proposition that provisions of 
the Vermont Constitution (including the “Common Benefits” Clause) 
may be interpreted differently than counterpart provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution,108 that economic regulation usually has some disparate 
 
“unbalanced impact is . . . a necessary consequence of the most reasonable way of implementing that 
policy”); In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, 565 A.2d 1349, 1350-51 (Vt. 
1989) (agreeing that the purpose of Equal Protection Clause is to protect individual, but the purpose 
of the “Common Benefits” Clause is to protect the polity from granting special privileges to the few; 
under Ludlow “[t]he purpose of the preferential legislation must be to further a goal independent of 
the preference awarded, sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny;” almost any legislation has 
disparate impact; such is sustainable “if the underlying policy supporting the regulation is a 
compelling one, and the unbalanced impact is, as a practical matter, a necessary consequence of the 
most reasonable way of implementing that policy.”); Bryant v. Town of Essex, 564 A.2d 1052, 1057 
(Vt. 1989) (under Ludlow the “Common Benefits” Clause requires party challenging law to show 
“that the classifications failed to rest on a rational basis serving a legitimate public policy 
objective”); Wolfe v. Yudichak, 571 A.2d 592, 602 (Vt. 1989) (Ludlow says almost all economic 
legislation tends to have disparate impact); Smith v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 554 A.2d 233, 239 (Vt. 
1988) (rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge to different voting rules for rural and urban areas based on 
Ludlow because in this area the “Common Benefits” Clause provides no greater protection than the 
federal Equal Protection Clause); In re Hill, 545 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Vt. 1988) (Ludlow cited for 
principles of separation of powers and judicial self-restraint); State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 201-
02 (Vt. 1987) (Ludlow set up stricter standard of review under “Common Benefits” Clause than 
applies under federal Equal Protection analysis); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301, 1310 (Vt. 1986) 
(Ludlow held that “[s]tate courts . . . have a duty of judicial restraint which encompasses . . . 
deference to legislative exercise of the sovereign power allocated to that body by the state 
constitution,” but dissenting judge says it is judicial responsibility “to balance competing interests 
and allocate losses,” so a new cause of action should be recognized in tort, id. at 1313); Choquette, 
475 A.2d at 1081 (Ludlow cited for principle that a statute is presumptively constitutional if “[o]n its 
face, the statute is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, nor is it devoid of a public purpose.”); 
State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982) (in criminal case involving questions of search, 
seizure, and confession Ludlow is cited for the principle that “the meaning of the Vermont 
Constitution is [not] identical to the federal document,” and sometimes has been construed “as 
protecting rights which were explicitly excluded from federal protection.”); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 
937, 939 (Vt. 1982) (Ludlow cited for proposition that Vermont Constitution may be interpreted 
differently than U.S. Constitution); see further State v. Ames Big N Department Store, 449 A.2d 984 
(Vt. 1982) (Ludlow controls this case decided the same day); State v. Grand Union Co., 449 A.2d 
984 (Vt. 1982) (Ludlow controls this case decided the same day). 
 107. See, e.g., In re Reapportionment, 624 A.2d at 337 (Ludlow held that preferential 
legislation must further a goal independent of the preference awarded); Town of Sandgate v. 
Colehamer, 589 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Vt. 1990) (Ludlow shows that legislation that prefers one group 
above another may be unconstitutional); In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, 565 
A.2d 1349, 1350-51 (Vt. 1989) (agreeing that the purpose of Equal Protection Clause is to protect 
individual, but the purpose of the “Common Benefits” Clause is to protect the polity from granting 
special privileges to the few; under Ludlow “[t]he purpose of the preferential legislation must be to 
further a goal independent of the preference awarded, sufficient to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny;” almost any legislation has disparate impact; such is sustainable “if the underlying policy 
supporting the regulation is a compelling one, and the unbalanced impact is, as a practical matter, a 
necessary consequence of the most reasonable way of implementing that policy.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 599 A.2d 1371, 1373 (Vt. 1991) (Ludlow established 
that “the Vermont Constitution is freestanding and may require this Court to examine more closely 
distinctions drawn by state government than would the Fourteenth Amendment.”); State v. Brunelle, 
534 A.2d 198, 201-02 (Vt. 1987) (Ludlow set up stricter standard of review under “Common 
Benefits” Clause than applies under federal Equal Protection analysis); State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 
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impact,109 and for the principle of deference to the legislature,110 but 
never for the “balancing approach” which the Baker majority discovers 
in the same cases. The Baker court simply misstated or misread the 
precedents. There is no support whatever in the “Common Benefits” 
Clause cases citing Ludlow for the Baker majority’s reading of Ludlow or 
its interpretation of the standard or analysis under the “Common 
Benefits” Clause. 
Just two years before Baker, in Brigham v. State, arguably the most 
significant “Common Benefits” Clause decision in the decade before 
Baker, the court overturned the state scheme for funding public 
education which resulted in wide differences in per-pupil educational 
spending.111 The court unequivocally stated: “We have held that the 
Common Benefits Clause in the Vermont Constitution, see ch. I, art. 7, is 
generally coextensive with the equivalent guarantee in the United States 
Constitution, and imports similar methods of analysis.”112 The court’s 
statement just two years later, in Baker, that for the past seventeen years 
(since Ludlow) it had really not been following the structured, multi-
tiered federal equal protection standard of review is obviously erroneous. 
Justice Dooley, who declined to join the majority opinion, noted this 
defect and took the majority to task for it in his separate concurring 
opinion.113 He began by stating that he feared that the rationale of the 
majority opinion might be “ignored” in the future,114 a prediction which 
 
336, 347 (Vt. 1982) (in criminal case involving questions of search, seizure, and confession Ludlow 
is cited for the principle that “the meaning of the Vermont Constitution is [not] identical to the 
federal document,” and sometimes has been construed “as protecting rights which were explicitly 
excluded from federal protection.”); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 939 (Vt. 1982) (Ludlow cited for 
proposition that Vermont Constitution may be interpreted differently than U.S. Constitution). 
 109. See, e.g., Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d 455, 459 (Vt. 1989) (summarizing holding of 
Ludlow as selective Sunday Closing law “did not serve ‘an appropriate and overriding public 
interest,’ nor did the State establish that the infringement of the rights of the citizens was merely 
incidental and that the objectives of the law could be reached in no other way”) and id. at 460 
(Ludlow stated that “virtually all regulatory statutes have disparate effects on various sectors of the 
public”); Wolfe v. Yudichak, 571 A.2d 592, 602 (Vt. 1989) (Ludlow says almost all economic 
legislation tends to have disparate impact). 
 110. See, e.g., J.L. v. Miller, 817 A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2002) (Ludlow shows that “[c]ourts have a 
duty to refrain from interfering with the sovereign powers of the legislature as allocated by the state 
constitution.”); In re Hill, 545 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Vt. 1988) (Ludlow cited for principles of separation 
of powers and judicial self-restraint); Choquette, 475 A.2d at (Vt. 1984) (Ludlow cited for principle 
that a statute is presumptively constitutional if “[o]n its face, the statute is not unreasonable, arbitrary 
or capricious, nor is it devoid of a public purpose.”); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301, 1310 (Vt. 
1986) (Ludlow held that “[s]tate courts . . . have a duty of judicial restraint which encompasses . . . 
deference to legislative exercise of the sovereign power allocated to that body by the state 
constitution”). 
 111. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). 
 112. Id. at 395 (emphasis added) (citing Lorrain v. Ryan, 628 A.2d 543, 550 (Vt. 19993) and 
State v. George, 602 A.2d 953, 957 (Vt. 1991). 
 113. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889-97 (Dooley, J., concurring). 
 114. Id. at 889. 
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my research of the case law citing Baker fully validates. He noted that 
“[u]ntil this decision” Vermont cases had recognized a distinction in the 
standard of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis applied to claims for 
protection of basic civil rights triggered a higher level of scrutiny than 
mere economic regulation.115 He noted that throughout the twentieth 
century “the jurisprudence in Vermont is similar to that of most 
states.”116 He faults the majority’s collapsing the “Common Benefits” 
Clause analysis into one standard higher than generally applied under the 
Equal Protection Clause because in so doing “the majority makes 
statements entirely contrary to our existing Article 7 jurisprudence.”117 
Again, my research fully confirms this criticism. Justice Dooley notes 
that by so doing, the majority “overrul[es] a long series of precedents” 
that used multi-tiered, structured “Common Benefits” Clause analysis.118 
He criticizes the court’s description of one case as “neither fair nor 
accurate,”119 and because it means that there is “no higher burden to 
justify” racial discrimination than discrimination against large retail 
stores, “the new standard” of analysis is not “required by, or even 
consistent with, the history on which the court bases it.”120 He finds 
“great irony” that the court adopts a higher standard of review which will 
result in less deference to the legislature.121 He also asserts that the 
majority mischaracterized the “Common Benefits” Clause precedents by 
stating that they “reflect a very different approach” from federal equality 
jurisprudence (noting several recent cases where the court said the 
standard of review “is the same” as under federal precedents.)122 He 
chides the majority for relying on “isolated statements” from Ludlow and 
squarely accuses the Baker majority of creating “a new, more active” 
standard of “Common Benefits” Clause review, rather than applying the 
established standard.123 The majority’s statement that the new activist 
standard has been consistently applied in the past is simply 
“incredible.”124 
To bolster its analytical approach, the majority discusses the text of 
the “Common Benefits” Clause. Although Chief Justice Amestoy has 
much to say about the philosophy, purpose and importance of textual 
 
 115. Id. at 890. 
 116. Id. at 891. 
 117. Id. at 893 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 893 (emphasis added) (citing nine cases). 
 119. Id. at 894, n.1 (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. at 894 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. at 894. 
 122. Id. at 894. 
 123. Id. at 895 (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at 895, n.3 (emphasis added). 
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analysis, he seems to be at a total loss when it comes to actually 
engaging in textual analysis. He concludes that “chief” among the 
principles expressed “is the principle of inclusion.”125 However, he 
provides no comparison with how the critical terms of the “Common 
Benefits” Clause were used in other documents of the period when the 
“Common Benefits” Clause was adopted, and no elucidation of the 
etymology of the terms. The majority’s plentiful ruminations are a poor 
substitute for meaningful textual analysis. The abstract generality of the 
principle (inclusion) discerned as the “core value” of the “Common 
Benefits” Clause adds little value to legal analysis, though it lays the 
foundation for several subsequent rhetorical flourishes the majority 
relishes. Likewise, the majority’s review of the “historical context,” 
while providing a very interesting review of the history of the “Common 
Benefits” Clause, and of the egalitarian impulses unleashed by the War 
of Independence,126 seems aimless and contributes little to the analysis of 
the question before the court.127 It provides only a very superficial 
examination of the purpose of the “Common Benefits” Clause128 and 
fails in any depth to relate that purpose to the institution of marriage.129 
In the section on “Analysis Under Article 7,” the court primarily 
summarizes the analysis it has distilled in the previous sections. A 
“relatively uniform standard, reflective of the inclusionary principle at its 
core, must govern” and “the rigid, multi-tiered analysis evolved by the 
federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment” is rejected.130 The 
group claiming exclusion must be defined, but not classified (such as 
“suspect”) because classification of the group “has never provided a 
stable mooring” for the “Common Benefits” Clause, and because such 
labeling is inherently subjective and unpredictable.131 The government’s 
statutory purpose must be examined to determine whether the 
discrimination “is reasonably necessary to accomplish the State’s 
 
 125. Id. at 875 (majority opinion). 
 126. Id. at 877 n.3. 
 127. The conclusion is that the “Common Benefits” Clause was aimed at “the elimination of 
artificial governmental preferments and advantages.” Id. at 877. 
 128. “No phrase except ‘liberty’ was invoked more often by the Revolutionaries than ‘the 
public good.’ It expressed the colonists’ deepest hatreds of the old order and their most visionary 
hopes for the new. . . . [They believed] that ‘all government . . . is or ought to be, calculated for the 
general good and safety of the community . . . . ‘The word republic’ said Thomas Paine, ‘means the 
public good, or the good of the whole . . . .’” GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 55 (1969). 
 129. For an example of a how the history of marriage related to republic theories of the 
founding era (which the Baker opinion fails to grasp), see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS, A 
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION, at 9-23 (2000). 
 130. Baker, 744 A.2d at 878. 
 131. Id. at 878, n.10. 
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claimed objectives,” in light of “the significance of the benefits and 
protections of the challenged law,” the promotion of the government’s 
goals, and the under or over-inclusiveness of the classification. 132 
Because that process involves imprecise “reasoned judgment,” the court 
is compelled to exercise restraint and to show respect for tradition.133 
Justice Dooley’s separate opinion notes that the one-high-standard 
approach for many years allowed courts in other jurisdictions to strike 
down social and economic legislation the judges disliked, and he laments 
the adoption of such an activist standard of review.134 He also 
condemned the subjectivity of the new standard of review “that relies 
wholly on factors and balancing, with no mooring in any criteria or 
guidelines, however imperfect they may be.”135 The new standard “is not 
at all predictable [and] [i]n the end, the approach the majority has 
developed relies too much on the identities and personal philosophies of 
the men and women who fill the chairs at the [Vermont] Supreme Court, 
too little on ascertainable standards . . ., and very little, if any, on 
deference to the legislative branch.”136 The “final irony” of the new test 
“is that the balancing and weighing process . . . describes exactly the 
process we would expect legislators to go through . . . . We are judges, 
not legislators.”137 Likewise, Justice Johnson, in her partially dissenting 
opinion, noted her “concerns about the test that the majority devises to 
review equal protection challenges under the Common Benefits 
Clause.”138 Justice Johnson agrees with Justice Dooley’s criticisms of the 
new standard of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis because “[t]he 
Chancellor’s foot is not a promising basis for antidiscrimination law.”139 
C. Application of “Common Benefits” Clause Standard 
The two justices who wrote separate opinions in Baker criticized the 
analytical approach of the majority because of its potential for 
subjectivity, and the actual application of that standard by the majority 
clearly validates that criticism. The majority opinion first noted that the 
 
 132. Id. at 878-79 (whether the discrimination “bears a reasonable and just relation to the 
government purpose”). 
 133. Id. at 879. 
 134. Id. at 896 (Dooley, J. concurring) (“We have wisely, in the past, avoided the path the 
majority now chooses, a path worn and abandoned in many other states.”). Id. at 895. 
 135. Id. at 897. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 907-08, n.13 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part). 
 139. Id. (citing Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 478 
(1996)). 
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category excluded from marriage was same-sex couples.140 Then it 
addressed the major justification for the exclusion, the link between 
marriage, procreation, and childrearing. The court rejected the marriage-
procreation-childrearing link for four reasons: infertile male-female 
marriages, artificial reproduction technology and practices, legalized 
adoption by gay couples, and substantial child-rearing by same-sex 
couples. However, these assertions evade rather than address the critical 
claim the State propounded. 
The majority had trouble remembering (perhaps understanding) the 
primary government justification for limiting marriage to male-female 
couples. It constantly switched that interest. The court first identified the 
“principle purpose” offered by the State for this discrimination as 
“furthering the link between procreation and childrearing.”141 The court 
then stated that the State “has a legitimate and longstanding interest in 
promoting a permanent commitment between couples for the security of 
their children.”142 In so doing, the court subtly (perhaps unwittingly 
rather than deviously) revised the state’s interest changing it from linking 
procreation and childrearing, to linking couples and childrearing. Still 
later, it again restated the state’s interest as to “legitimate children and 
provide for their security,”143 again missing the critical procreation 
element in the marriage-childrearing link. It only returned to the critical 
marriage-procreation-childbearing link when stating it’s conclusion that 
there was “extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the 
stated purposes of the law – protecting children and ‘furthering the link 
between procreation and child rearing’ . . . .”144 It immediately slipped 
off target again stating that the state’s goal was “promoting a 
commitment between married couples and to promote the security of 
their children and the community as a whole . . . .”145 But it summarily 
added that “[p]romoting a link between procreation and childrearing 
similarly fails to support the exclusion.”146 The court also asserted that 
the marriage classification was “significantly underinclusive” because 
many married couples never intend to procreate and they have “no 
logical connection to the stated government goal.”147 
Next, the court cited sensational estimates that between six and 
fourteen million children are being raised by gay fathers or lesbian 
 
 140. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 (majority opinion). 
 141. Id. at 881. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 882. 
 144. Id. at 884. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 881. 
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mothers, and that between 1.5 million and five million lesbian mothers 
resided with their children in the US in 1990.148 While there are no doubt 
many same-sex couples raising children, the reference to such grossly 
inflated data only undermines the credibility of the court’s opinion. The 
court’s admission that “accurate statistics are difficult to obtain”149 is no 
excuse for citing two of the most inflated reports and not any of the more 
responsible estimates. While “there is no dispute that a significant 
number of children” are being raised by same-sex partners,150 there is a 
huge difference between a significant number in the thousands and a 
significant number in the millions, and that difference apparently matters 
to the court’s analysis because it felt compelled to cite the millions 
estimates to make its point. 
The court must have felt desperate to even mention such exaggerated 
numbers. The exaggeration is shown by several census reports. The 2000 
Census Report revealed that in 2000 (the year beginning just three days 
after the Baker decision) there were a total of just under 5,500,000 adult 
couples living together unmarried (5,475,768 unmarried partner 
households).151 Of that number, only 301,026 were male householders 
with male partners, and 293,366 were female householders with female 
partners; in total, there were 594,392 same-sex couples reported by the 
2000 Census, just fewer than 11 percent of the total population of 
nonmarital cohabitants.152 To reach the minimal number of children 
estimated as being raised in one irresponsible study cited by the Vermont 
Supreme Court, all of the same-sex couples reported in the 2000 Census 
would have to be raising children, and they would have to be raising 
more than 10 children per couple; and they would have to be all raising 
nearly thirty children per couple to reach the highest estimate of children 
being raised by same-sex couples in that same study! 
The most recent Census Report on the number of children living with 
a parent and an unmarried partner reveals that 1,799,000 children are 
living with their mother and her unmarried partner (both heterosexual 
and homosexual), and 1,081,000 children are living with their father and 
his unmarried partner (both heterosexual and homosexual), for a total of 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 2002 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 48, table 49. 
 152. 2000 Census <http://www.census.gov> cited in WORLD CONGRESS OF FAMILIES 
UPDATE, ONLINE! Vol. 03, Iss. 02 (15 Jan 2002). Likewise, the total nonmarital cohabitant 
householder population including same-sex and heterosexual cohabitants, constituted only 5 percent 
of all households in the United States in the 2000 Census, compared to 52 percent for married couple 
households. 2000 Census. Id. 
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2,880,000 children being raised by a parent and a nonmarital partner.153 
Applying the proportion of heterosexual and same-sex nonmarital 
cohabitant couples, eleven percent (11 %), suggests that only 317,000 
children are being raised by same-sex couples. The Census Bureau also 
reports that 2,570,000 children under 15 are living with a single parent 
and his or her unmarried partner, including 2,101,000 POSSLQs 
(Persons of the Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters) and 469,000 
others.154 Even if all of these others were same-sex couples (and the 
study explicitly rejects that because roommates, housemates and other 
non-partners are included in that number), that would still amount to less 
than 1/10th of the two middle estimates the Vermont Supreme Court 
mentioned and 1/30th of the high estimate they stated. The 2000 Census 
reportedly indicates that about 20 percent of gay couples and about one-
third of lesbian couples are raising children.155 
The latest Census Bureau report on adopted children, Adopted 
Children and Stepchildren: 2000,156 shows that a total of 57,693 adopted 
children are living with men or women with an unmarried partner. That 
includes heterosexual nonmarital partners (who greatly outnumber same-
sex partners in the population) as well as same-sex partners.157 Applying 
the generous 11 percent ratio found by the 2000 Census to estimate how 
many of these children are living with same-sex couples, less than 6,350 
adopted children are being raised by same-sex partners. The point is that 
the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker egregiously stretched to insert 
highly inflated data to try to support its point. That is neither good 
statistical analysis, nor good legal analysis. 
The court returned to the “reality” of child-rearing by same-sex 
couples when it asserted that “the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
the legal protections incident to marriage exposes their children to the 
precise risks that the State argues the marriage laws are designed to 
secure against.”158 That point is certainly relevant and worth considering 
 
 153. Jason Fields, Children’s Living Arrangements and Characteristics: March 2002, in 
Current Population Reports (June 2003), at 2, Table 1, Children by Age and Family Structure, 
March 2002, at <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf> (last visited August 28, 
2003). 
 154. Fields, supra note 153 at 4, Table 2, Children under 15 Living With Mothers and Fathers 
in Cohabiting-Couple Households: 2002, at <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf> 
(last visited August 28, 2003). 
 155. Christopher Seeley, Gay Parents face back-to-school jitters, Southernvoice.com at 
http://www.sovo.com/2003/8-8/news/localnews/gayparents.cfm (last visited August 28, 2003). 
 156. Census Bureau, Adopted Children and Stepchildren: 2000 <http://adoption.about.com/ 
gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr%2D6.pdf> and 
<http://adoption.about.com/cs/resstatstrends/a/census2000.htm> (seen Sept. 16, 2003), cited in 
William L. Pierce, Adoption Numbers, NRO, Guest Comment, August 27, 2003. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882. 
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with respect to another state interest — the interest in optimal child-
rearing or, as the State put it, “‘promoting child rearing in a setting that 
provides both male and female role models.’”159 But it is not relevant to 
assessing the propriety of restricting marriage to male-female couples to 
promote the procreation-childrearing link. 
The court concluded from these considerations that the marriage 
statute “plainly excludes many same-sex couples who are no different 
from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives.”160 Again, it 
noted that “the marriage exclusion treats persons who are similarly 
situated for purposes of the law differently.”161 It held that there was 
“extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the stated 
purposes of the law . . . .”162 These statements are bald conclusions 
unsupported by facts, precedents, or analysis. Moreover, the purpose of 
the law as to which the court sees male-female and same-sex couples 
having no difference is not the purpose or state interest the court purports 
to be discussing (the state’s interest in furthering the linkage between 
procreation and child-rearing) but another interest (child welfare). Even 
if same-sex couples satisfied the state’s interest in child-rearing and child 
welfare just as well as did male-female couples (a separate and very 
dubious proposition),163 on the issue of furthering the state’s interest in 
establishing linkage between procreation and child-rearing that point is 
irrelevant. Because same-sex couples cannot procreate at all, permitting 
them to marry will not establish significant linkage between procreation 
and childrearing.164 
The procreation link was brushed aside because married couples can 
use artificial reproductive technologies to generate children and “there is 
no reasonable basis to conclude that a same-sex couple’s use of the same 
technologies would undermine the bonds of parenthood, or society’s 
 
 159. Id. at 884 (quoting the State’s brief). 
 160. Id. at 882 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 884 (emphasis added). 
 163. That basis for the court’s “no difference” conclusion with respect to the separate interest 
of providing for the welfare of children is also very feeble, but that is a topic for another article. 
 164. It might be argued that allowing same-sex couples to marry would partially foster this 
linkage because, for example, some lesbians might never undertake to bear and rear a child by 
themselves, but with a same-sex marriage partner they would; so same-sex marriage would foster the 
partial linkage because it would encourage such a lesbian to procreate and rear a child who is related 
to her. However, this approach partially undermines the state interest in linking procreation and 
child-rearing because it involves the deliberate exclusion of the other biological parent from the 
marriage. The resulting child-rearing is distinguishable because the child is reared in a relationship 
from which the other procreative parent has been deliberately excluded, denying the child the benefit 
of dual-gender child-rearing. See Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex 
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 806-
13 (2001) (discussing the Baker procreation analysis in similar terms). 
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perception of parenthood.”165 But the court evaded the fact that often an 
assisted reproduction technique is employed by married couples to assist 
the couple to procreate—to have a child that is the genetic offspring of 
both partners. Assisted reproduction never allows a same-sex couple to 
procreate a child that is the genetic offspring of both partners. It still 
takes a man and a woman to procreate. 
The use of ART by married couples to imitate natural procreation 
presents a dramatically different issue than the use of ART by same-sex 
couples to obtain a child to raise. From the perspective of responsible 
procreation, the attempt to bring children into a relationship that is in 
form and kind and gender union the same as the procreative union can be 
distinguished from the attempt to bring children into a homosexual 
relationship of two men or two women. The court noted that “the reality 
today is that increasing numbers of same-sex couples are employing 
increasingly efficient assisted-reproductive techniques to conceive and 
raise children.”166 However, this misstates the point and the mistake is 
more than semantic. While same-sex couples may rear a child as a 
couple, they cannot conceive a child as a couple . They cannot procreate 
as a couple. They may contract with a person of the opposite sex, and 
with that person one member of the same-sex couple may procreate for 
the purpose of producing a child that both partners plan to raise together; 
but the same-sex couple cannot as a couple procreate—with or without 
assisted reproduction technology. Some ART may help married couples 
to procreate (artificial insemination using the husband’s sperm, in vitro 
fertilization using the wife’s egg and husband’s sperm, etc.). In those 
cases, ART furthers the linkage between procreation and child-rearing. 
The fact that some nonmarital male-female couples may also procreate 
using ART tells us nothing about marriage law or whether an exception 
should be made to marriage laws that historically have furthered that 
state interest; it only tells us that in the context of dealing with 
childlessness and infertility, lawmakers have determined that the state 
interest in linking child-rearing and procreation is partially subordinate to 
other important interests (e.g., allowing responsible persons to bear and 
rear children who are at least partially related genetically to them or their 
spouse or partner). It provides no guidance regarding whether, in the 
marriage context, the state’s possible interest in promoting or favoring 
same-sex unions outweighs the state’s interest in preserving marriage as 
an institution that fosters the linkage between procreation and child-
rearing. 
 
 165. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882. 
 166. Id. 
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The court noted that there is no indication that married couples’ use 
of ART technologies has “undermine[d] a married couple’s sense of 
parental responsibility, or foster[ed] the perception that they are ‘mere 
surplusage’ . . . .”167 But the issue before the court was not whether 
allowing same-sex couples to use assisted reproduction technology 
undermines the bonds of parenthood, or society’s perception of 
parenthood,168 but whether allowing same-sex couples to marry 
undermines the linkage between procreation and child-rearing. However, 
the fact that state lawmakers may have chosen to partially subordinate 
the state interest in linking child-rearing and procreation in order to 
promote another state interest (allowing the procreation of children who 
are partially related to the parents) hardly compels the conclusion that the 
State must always subordinate its primary interest, or that the states may 
not preserve marriage as the institution which best fosters the linkage 
between procreation and child-rearing. The contexts are different (as 
marriage differs from ART) and the strength of the competing policies 
differ. 
The majority, again, apparently misunderstood the real state interest. 
The court apparently believed the goal of the law was to exclude from 
marriage all those who cannot procreate.169 However, the State never 
said that the purpose of its law was to exclude non-procreative couples; 
rather its purpose was inclusive, to “further[] the link between 
procreation and child rearing” by extending the benefits and status of 
marriage to those who are capable or may be capable of both procreation 
and child-rearing.170 Of course, since no same-sex couple is capable of 
procreating, including same-sex couples in marriage could not further the 
link between procreation and child-rearing.171 
Likewise, the state did not assert that the purpose of the marriage 
restriction (to male-female couples) was that every married couple 
procreates. Rather, the purpose of the law restricting marriage to male-
female couples was to further the linkage between procreation and child-
rearing. It does that by restricting marriage to couples in categories 
capable of doing both. 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. They already can and do use ART; whether as a matter of policy that should be allowed 
or may be prohibited is an issue for another case and another day. 
 169. Thus, the court incorrectly criticized the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage for 
being “underinclusive” (not overinclusive). Baker, 744 A.2d at 881. It would only be underinclusive 
if the purpose of the law was to exclude non-procreative couples. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish,” supra note 164, at 811-13 (2001) 
(similar analysis). 
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Allowing male-female couples to marry, even those who cannot or 
will not procreate, conveys a message that links marriage with 
procreation because, as a general category of unions (contrasted with 
same-sex unions), male-female unions are capable of human procreation 
(and most do procreate). Same-sex couples cannot ever procreate. 
Allowing same-sex couples to marry would not further the state’s 
interests in linking procreation and child-rearing because same-sex 
couples are categorically incapable of procreation as couples. 
The majority also discussed “the history and significance” of 
marriage, concluding that its main significance was in providing the 
parties with “significant public benefits and protections,”172 listing more 
than a dozen statutory benefits extended to married couples.173 It 
summarily concluded without analysis that limiting those benefits to 
male-female couples did not further any of the states’ seven asserted 
justifications.174 
Three times the Baker majority refers to the fact that the Vermont 
legislature has legalized adoptions by gay and lesbian couples, and 
extended child contact and child support laws to cover same-sex couples, 
to support its conclusion that limiting marriage to male-female couples 
violates the “Common Benefits” Clause.175 This seems more than a little 
disingenuous inasmuch as the legislature did not act to authorize same-
sex couples to adopt until after the Vermont Supreme Court had ruled 
that the former statute needed to be interpreted that way because “[t]here 
is no reason in law, logic or social philosophy to obstruct” same-sex 
couples from adopting,176 and to do so is “inconsistent with the children’s 
best interests . . . .”177 The court’s concealment of the judicial “nudge” 
behind the policy extension at least taints the reference to the adoption 
laws as manifestation of a bona fide indication of Vermont citizens’ 
public policy. Nor does the court acknowledge that the policy issue 
concerning whether to allow same-sex couples to adopt children who are 
missing and in need of one or both parents is quite different than the 
policy issue whether to allow same-sex couples to marry. As a method of 
addressing the needs of children, to allow same-sex adoption provides a 
significantly different and potentially more prudent deviation from 
 
 172. Baker, 744 A.2d at 883. 
 173. Id. at 884. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 882, 885, and 886. 
 176. In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (quoting In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 
1002 (Sur.Ct.1992)). 
 177. In re B.L.V.B. 628 A.2d at 1276. See also id. at 1273 (the court must “avoid results that 
are irrational, unreasonable or absurd”). 
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history and social mores than to more broadly legalize same-sex 
marriage. 
The modification of the Vermont adoption law certainly is a relevant 
point because allowing same-sex couples to adopt shows that inclusion 
of same-sex couples in child-rearing does not necessarily damage 
irreparably the state interest in promoting the connection between 
procreation and child-rearing. Moreover, the fact that for over a hundred 
years Vermont has permitted adoption to occur and that it has not 
irreparably damaged the linkage between procreation and child-rearing—
many people still procreate to produce the children they rear, and there is 
no evidence that substantial numbers of fertile couples forego 
procreation because they can adopt instead—shows that some exception 
to the policy linking procreation and child-rearing is possible that does 
not significantly undermine the policy. Unfortunately, it does not help us 
discern whether legalizing same-sex marriage would, similarly, fail to 
undermine the state’s interest in linking procreation and childrearing. 
That same-sex couples may adopt tells us something about adoption but 
very little about marriage. Adoption is for the benefit of children for 
whom the linkage of procreation to child-rearing has already failed, so it 
makes no sense to evaluate any adoption law in terms of the state interest 
in fostering that linkage. All adoptions (regardless of the sexual 
preferences of the adopter) defy this linkage by allowing an adult or 
adults who did not procreate a child to formalize a child-rearing 
relationship and legal parental status. Thus, it is senseless to use adoption 
law—which operates when the linkage has failed—as a tool to evaluate 
whether to revise marriage law—which operates to support the linkage—
to permit marriage by same-sex couples who are categorically incapable 
of procreation. Perhaps one reason that adoption (even by gay couples) 
has not eroded the linkage is that the law limiting marriage to male-
female couples still reinforces that link by preserving a powerful cultural 
and social institution that perpetuates the linkage. The fact that adoption 
laws may allow same-sex couples to adopt in order to assist some 
children who are in need of adoption tells us very little about marriage or 
marriage policy, which exists to further different state purposes (at least 
one of which, the linkage of procreation to child-rearing, no adoption can 
further).178 
The main problem with the court’s “analysis” of the interest in 
linking procreation and child-rearing is that it contains virtually no 
analysis of that state interest (unless evasion and redundancy count as 
 
 178. See generally, Lofton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Children & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
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analysis). The court dutifully listed some of the State’s arguments, but 
then consistently failed to engage those arguments, and recast and 
distorted the one state interest it tried to evaluate instead of engaging and 
confronting it. 
Finally, the court rejected the history of criminal prohibition of 
same-sex relations suggesting that it was “motivated by an animus 
against a class,” reflected outmoded “eighteenth-century standards,” and 
because (more significantly) recent Vermont legislation repealed fellatio 
laws, prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and 
barred “hate crimes.”179 The court concluded this section noting that 
there was “no reasonable and just basis” for exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the benefits of marriage.180 However, those reforms reflect 
the movement to tolerate private, consensual homosexual conduct, rather 
than to give homosexual unions preferred (marital) status. 
Two justices agreed with the result of the majority’s analysis, but 
declined to endorse the analysis. Justice Dooley insisted that suspect 
classification analysis was appropriate and declined to endorse the 
majority rationale.181 Justice Johnson, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, based her conclusion that Vermont marriage law violated the 
Vermont Constitution on sex discrimination grounds instead of the 
majority’s analysis.182 
Crucially, the majority failed to apply one critical element of the 
standard of analysis they purported to set: to exercise restraint and to 
show respect for established legal institutions and thousands of years of 
social tradition.183 
D. Remedy 
While the plaintiffs sought marriage licenses by declaratory and 
injunctive relief, the court held only that the plaintiffs were entitled “to 
obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to 
married opposite-sex couples.”184 Noting that a number of statutory 
schemes might be enacted which would provide plaintiffs the equal 
 
 179. Baker, 744 A.2d at 885-86. 
 180. Id. at 886. 
 181. Id. at 896 (Dooley, J. concurring). “We have wisely, in the past, avoided the path the 
majority now chooses, a path worn and abandoned in many other states.” Id. at 895. Justice Dooley’s 
opinion exemplified solid legal analysis, but it proceeded from a flawed assumption about suspect 
classification. 
 182. Id. at 907-08, n.13 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part). Justice Johnson’s feminist gender 
discrimination analysis of marriage as a repressive, male-favoring institution panders to the radical 
feminist audience, but is more notable for its ideological stance than its credible legal analysis. 
 183. Id. at 879 (majority opinion). 
 184. Id. at 886. 
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protection to which the court concluded they were entitled, the court left 
it to the legislature to craft appropriate remedial legislation in order to 
avoid “disruptive and unforeseen consequences” and “uncertainty and 
confusion” that might flow from a judicial decree.185 It rejected the 
dissenter’s charge of abdication, reemphasizing that the court did not 
hold that plaintiffs were entitled to a marriage license, only to equal 
benefits and protections.186 Decisiveness should not be confused with 
wisdom, nor is the court the only repository of wisdom; courts “do best 
by proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather than preclusive . . . .”187 
The majority’s discussion of the remedy is interesting because, rather 
than granting a remedy, it identified the range of remedies that would be 
constitutional and turned the crafting of a remedy over to the legislature 
which then provided a remedy the plaintiffs did not seek. Only Justice 
Johnson dissented from this remedial approach. She concluded that the 
court was abdicating its responsibility by not issuing a decree to permit 
same-sex marriages.188 She compared the need to provide prompt redress 
for denial of the right to marry to the need for prompt action to protect 
racial minorities’ civil rights,189 and of issuing a mere “advisory opinion” 
instead of fulfilling its judicial responsibility to obey the “commands of 
our constitution.”190 
The court concluded with a stirring rhetorical flourish. “The 
extension of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge plaintiffs as 
Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal protection and 
security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human 
relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our 
common humanity.”191 Interestingly, this could have been said by a court 
rejecting plaintiffs’ claims. That is, if it were only a matter of 
recognizing common humanity, there surely are many ways to 
accomplish that without legalizing and extending to same-sex unions the 
highly unique and preferred status, benefits, and protections afforded 
marriage. 
 
 185. Id. at 887. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 888. 
 188. Id. at 899-904 (Johnson, J. dissenting in part). 
 189. Id. at 901-04. 
 190. Id. at 904. 
 191. Id. at 889 (majority opinion). 
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V.  HOW BAKER MAY BE LIMITED AND AVOIDED, AND WHY FUTURE 
CLAIMS FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE LIKELY 
TO IMITATE BAKER 
A. How Baker May Be Distinguished 
There are a number of bases for distinguishing and limiting Baker 
that would lead one to rationally conclude that Baker is likely to have 
little influence in other courts. First, textually, very few other states have 
a “Common Benefits” Clause in their constitutions.192 Second, the Baker 
court notes that its “Common Benefits” Clause “was borrowed verbatim 
from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which was based, in turn, 
upon a similar provision in the Virginia Declarations of Rights of 
1776.”193 Yet the dramatically expansive construction of the 222-year-
old “Common Benefits” Clause of the Vermont Constitution by the 
Baker court stands in stark contrast to the interpretation of “Common 
Benefits” clauses in other state Constitutions. 
Third, the Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that the Vermont 
“Common Benefits” Clause “differs markedly from the federal Equal 
Protection Clause” not only in its origins, history and language, but also 
in its “purpose and development.”194 Cases interpreting the “Common 
Benefits” Clause, it declared, “reflect a very different approach from 
 
 192. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 10 (“Government being instituted for the common 
benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or 
emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are 
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, 
the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of 
nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good 
and happiness of mankind.”); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“That government being instituted for the 
common benefit, the doctrine of non- resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, 
slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (“That 
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the 
people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which 
is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured 
against the danger of maladministration; and, whenever any government shall be found inadequate 
or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and 
indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to 
the public weal.”); W.VA. CONST. art. 3, § 3 (“Government is instituted for the common benefit, 
protection and security of the people, nation or community. Of all its various forms that is the best, 
which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually 
secured against the danger of maladministration; and when any government shall be found 
inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community has an indubitable, 
inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it in such manner as shall be judged 
most conducive to the public weal.”). 
 193. Baker, 744 A.2d at 875. 
 194. Id. at 870 (emphasis added). 
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current federal jurisprudence.”195 The court emphasized that the 
“Common Benefits” Clause could be (and had been) interpreted to 
“provide more generous protection to rights . . . than afforded by the 
federal charter.”196 Thus, attempts to import the Baker rationale into 
Equal Protection Clause analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
under similar equality provisions of state constitutions, will find it 
difficult to bridge the uniqueness and distinctiveness gap which the 
Vermont Supreme Court emphasized and heavily relied upon in Baker. 
Fourth, the weakness of the critical analysis in Baker certainly 
should limit (and to this point apparently has limited) the precedential 
influence of the decision. The majority analysis is, as Judge Dooley 
predicted, little more than an ipse dixit.197 The feeble legal analysis of the 
majority opinion was not the result of incompetence of the justices. 
Indeed, several parts of the Baker opinions show that the court was 
clearly capable of disciplined, legitimate legal analysis.198 Rather, the 
collapse of analysis in the Baker opinion resulted from judicial over-
reaching, haste, trying too hard to get to a predetermined political end 
(and perhaps the desire to get there first), and perhaps trying to show off. 
It was a defect of will, not skill, resulting from the triumph of personal 
preference over the chafing restraints of the discipline of legal 
analysis.199 
 
 195. Id. at 871 (emphasis added). 
 196. Id. at 870 (quoting State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982)). 
 197. Latin for “he himself has said (it); hence, an arbitrary or dogmatic statement.” 
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 772 (1964). 
 198. For instance, the statutory analysis in the court’s opinion was careful, well-supported, and 
consistent with precedent and theory. Baker, 744 A.2d at 868-69; see infra notes 81 through 89 and 
accompanying text. Likewise, the majority’s rejection of the assertion (embraced by Justice Dooley) 
that lesbians and gay men are a suspect class, if quite brief, was logical, appropriately cited and 
followed numerous cases, distinguished others, and identified the practical inconsistency of that 
approach. Id. at 878, n.10 (noting that it is a “‘less than exacting standard’ by which to measure the 
prudence of a court’s exercise of its powers,” there is “less predictability in the outcome of future 
cases,” and criticizing “[t]he artificiality of suspect-class labeling . . . .”). Similarly, the majority’s 
rejection of the claim (embraced by Justice Johnson) that not allowing same-sex couples to marry 
constitutes sex discrimination was incisive, well-supported, and logical, albeit very abbreviated. Id. 
at 880, n.13 (noting that “marriage laws are facially neutral; they do not single out men or women as 
a class for disparate treatment, but rather prohibit men and women equally from marrying persons of 
the same sex,” distinguishing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1969) because the purpose of 
antimiscegenation laws was to maintain racially discriminatory white supremacy, and distinguishing 
discriminatory elements of long-repealed marriage-related statutes from evidence of discriminatory 
purpose of surviving marriage laws). 
 199. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“It is not reasoned judgment that supports the Court’s decision; only personal 
predilection.”). 
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B. Why Baker Is the Probable Shape of the Future in Some States 
While Baker can and should have (and to date has had) very little 
impact on legal analysis generally, and the analysis of same-sex marriage 
claims in particular, there are implications that the Baker result is the 
new direction of the movement for legalization of same-sex marriage. It 
is the likely outcome of same-sex marriage litigation in at least a few 
other states. 
First, some of the leading advocates of same-sex marriage endorse 
establishment of same-sex civil unions or domestic partnership instead of 
marriage as an incremental step toward ultimately legalizing same-sex 
marriage. For example, Profession William N. Eskridge, in his book 
Equality Practice, Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights, 
recommends a strategy that he calls equality practice—”equality for 
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and their relationships is a liberal right for 
which there is no sufficient justification for state denial—but it is not a 
right that ought to be delivered immediately, if it would unsettle the 
community.”200 Thus, like the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker, 
Professor Eskridge distinguishes between immediate recognition of 
rights for same-sex couples, and provision of specific remedies, such as 
same-sex marriage. He sees this approach as having the advantage of 
“recogniz[ing] the need to accommodate new ideas and the inability of 
human beings and their communities to do so without a long process of 
education and personal experience.”201 The Vermont marriage-equivalent 
“civil unions statute is not equality,” notes Eskridge, but “ it is at least 
equality practice.”202 This “incremental” process is much more likely to 
produce permanent transformation of society’s attitudes about same-sex 
relationships.203 
A compromise approach is also recommended by respected 
conservative Judge Richard Posner. Instead of legalizing same-sex 
marriage, he opines that same-sex domestic partnerships should be 
created to give a marriage-like status to same-sex unions while 
preserving the status of marriage for male-female couples. Several years 
before Baker he suggested: 
[S]ince the public hostility to homosexuals in this country is too 
widespread to make homosexual marriage a feasible proposal even if it 
is on the balance cost-justified, maybe the focus should be shifted to an 
 
 200. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY 
RIGHTS at xiii (2002). 
 201. Id. at xv. 
 202. Id. at 148. 
 203. Id. 
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intermediate solution that would give homosexuals most of what they 
want . . . .Denmark and Sweden, not surprisingly, provide the model.204 
With the combined support of leading liberal intellectuals, like 
Professor Eskridge, and conservative intellectuals, like Judge Posner, it is 
not unlikely that most individual intellectuals as well as the institutions 
in which intellectuals have significant influence, will exert increasing 
pressure to legalize same-sex unions and giving them essentially the 
same legal rights and benefits as marriage, but calling them by some 
other label. 
Second, the distinction between marriage and some marriage-like 
status is one of the subtexts that can be found in the recent holding of the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas.205 There, the Supreme Court by 6-
3 vote held that a Texas sodomy statute that criminally prohibited 
homosexual (but not heterosexual) sodomy violated an unwritten 
constitutional liberty of consenting adults to engage in private sexual 
relationships. There were four opinions in the case; Justice Kennedy 
wrote the majority opinion for five justices holding that the Texas 
sodomy law violated substantive due process; Justice O’Connor wrote a 
separate concurring opinion (which no one joined) arguing that the law 
violated equal protection; Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion (joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas); and Justice Thomas 
filed a short separate dissenting opinion. 
The majority opinion in Lawrence was careful to explicitly note that 
the issue before the Court did not involve marriage and the Court was not 
mandating same-sex marriage,206 and the concurring opinion of Justice 
O’Connor in dicta clearly indicated that the state had a valid basis for 
limiting marriage to male-female couples.207 However, unlike 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, the majority opinion in Lawrence did 
not clearly declare (in dicta) that the limitation of marriage to male-
female couples was justifiable under the Lawrence rationale, and to the 
hints of the majority that the marriage issue could be viewed differently, 
 
 204. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 313-314 (1992). 
 205. 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 206. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (“The present case does not involve minors . . . . It does not 
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationships that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.”). See also 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 207. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O’Connor, J., concurring), at 7 (slip op.) (Lawrence “does 
not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail 
under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here such as . . . 
preserving the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex unions – 
the asserted state interest in this case – other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage 
beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”) 
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the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia bluntly warned: “Do not believe 
it.”208 He noted that the rationale of the majority opinion 
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a 
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, 
insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral 
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no longer a legitimate state 
interest” for purpose of proscribing that conduct . . . and if, as the Court 
coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct 
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,” . . . 
what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of 
marriage to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by 
the Constitution,” ibid.?209 
Doctrinally, Justice Kennedy’s approach in Lawrence was 
predictable from an extra-judicial philosophical perspective. He 
essentially suggests that there is a distinction between the state regulation 
(prohibition and punishment) of private sexual behavior and state 
recognition or promotion of public status or benefits. His opinion 
specifically holds that the State may not criminally punish private 
homosexual behavior between consenting adults, and explicitly 
distinguishes a number of situations in which public acts, benefits or 
interests may be involved. This is the position taken by distinguished 
Oxford and Notre Dame Natural Law philosopher, John Finnis,210 whose 
position has been described by distinguished pro-gay-marriage Professor 
William Eskridge as “friendly to decriminalizing consensual private 
sodomy,”211 but opposing “same-sex marriage, antidiscrimination laws, 
and other public stamps of approval for homosexuality.”212 
The distinction between prohibiting sodomy and legalizing same-sex 
marriage is made by arch-economic-analyst Richard Posner in his book, 
Sex and Reason,213 a source that was cited prominently in the majority 
opinion in Lawrence.214 Just as the Lawrence decision tracks the 
 
 208. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
Thomas, J.). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See generally John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1049, 1052-76 (1994) (decriminalization and privatization of homosexual behavior 
justified but not public acceptance or promotion of nonmarital including homosexual sex); John M. 
Finnis, Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation,” 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 11, 28 
(1995); See also John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 45 MERCER L REV. 687, 697-98 
(1994). 
 211. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of AntiGay Discourse and 
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1349 (2000). 
 212. Id. at 1346. 
 213. Id. at 1346, 1349 (citing POSNER, supra n. 203 at 311-12). 
 214. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 1283. See also, id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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distinction between private sexual conduct and public marriage drawn by 
Judge Posner, the end result of Lawrence is also indicated by Judge 
Posner who (as above-noted) suggests in Sex and Reason that instead of 
legalizing same-sex marriage, same-sex domestic partnership should be 
created to give a marriage-like status to same-sex unions while 
preserving the status of marriage for male-female couples.215 Thus, more 
likely than laying the foundation for same-sex marriage, Lawrence seems 
to lay the foundation for a ruling like the Vermont Supreme Court 
decision in Baker v. State mandating the legalization of (at least) a 
marriage-equivalent same-sex domestic partnership or civil union. 
C. Avoiding Baker In Other States By Amending the State Constitution 
The Baker decision could have been avoided if the Vermont 
Constitution had been amended to protect the unique status and benefits 
of marriage and the extension of them only to married male-female 
couples. In at least four states, constitutional amendments have been 
passed either in reaction to judicial rulings that seemed headed in the 
direction of Baker or because of such rulings in other states. Voters in 
Hawaii,216 Alaska,217 Nebraska,218 and Nevada219 overwhelmingly 
approved constitutional amendments to prevent a Baker ruling in their 
state (by nearly 70-30 margins). The people of Vermont have tried to 
amend their constitution after Baker, but the constitutional amendment 
 
 215. POSNER, supra note 203 at 312-14. 
 216. The people of Hawaii repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional 
amendment authorizing the legislature to limit marriage to the union of a man and a woman by a 
vote of 69 percent to 29 percent. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its 
Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 HAWAII L. REV. 19, 20 (2000) (citing See Mike Yuen, Same-Sex 
Marriage Strongly Rejected, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Nov. 4, 1998, at A1; Complete, Uncertified 
Results of Hawaii’s General Election: State Constitution, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 5, 1998, at 
B3). 
 217. The people of Alaska repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman by 68 percent to 32 percent. 
<http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/elect98/general/results.htm>. See generally Kevin G. 
Clarkson, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA 
L. REV. 213 (1999). 
 218. The people of Nebraska repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman, and rejecting same-sex civil 
unions or domestic partnerships in 2000 by 70 percent to 30 percent. Nebraska Secretary of State, 
Statewide General Election 2000 Results, Number 416, For 477,571 [70.10%], Against 203667 
[29.89%]. 
 219. The people of Nevada repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman twice, in two separate ballot votes 
(required to ratify the constitutional amendment) by 70 percent to 30 percent in 2000. See ABC 
News, 2000 The Vote, Nevada Real-Time Vote Results, <http://abcnews.go.com/ 
sections/politics/2000vote/general/nv.html> (seen 2 April 2002). See also Nevada Secretary of State 
Dean Heller, Election Coverage and Reports, General Election, Nov. 7, 2000 at 
<http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/nvelection.htm>; NEV. CONST. art. 1 § 21 (Michie Supp. 2003). 
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process in Vermont is very anti-populist. It requires that a proposed 
amendment be passed by majorities in both houses of the state legislature 
in two successive sessions.220 
Probably the most important lesson of the Baker decision is that our 
courts are not immune from the temptation to engage in political policy-
making in the guise of interpreting state constitutions. The founders of 
our nation relied upon the constraints of precedent, legal analysis and 
judicial integrity to keep the courts from becoming political 
instruments.221 While those barriers have a pretty good track record 
overall during the past two centuries, we live in different times, and the 
pressures on the judiciary brought by advocates of same-sex marriage are 
formidable. As Baker shows, the genteel constraints of professionalism, 
tradition, process, and personal integrity may not suffice to prevent the 
political abuse of judicial constitutional policy-making under such 
pressures. 
Constitutionalization of family law can occur by constitutional 
amendment as well as by judicial decision. Protection for basic family 
institutions in constitutions is not uncommon in the western world.222 For 
 
 220. Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L. REV. 93, 111 
(2000) (“under the Vermont Constitution, the amendment process could not begin until 2003, would 
require two votes of the General Assembly with an intervening election, and could not be completed 
before 2005”). 
 221. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 78 (Hamilton) at 471; id, No. 81 (Hamilton) at 484-85 
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 222. For example, the German Constitution provides: “Marriage and the family shall enjoy the 
protection of the state.” GG Art. 6(1) (F.R.G). See also Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1998) (noting that at the time 
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several reasons, there are advantages to constitutionalizing family law at 
the state level. A fundamental social institution like marriage should be 
given constitutional protection at the level of the state constitution 
(where the polis is more likely to develop a consensus, and where 
minority voices can be accommodated better than at a national level). 
While a baseline may need to be established in national constitutional 
law, there are good reasons for states to enact constitutional protection 
for the institution of conjugal marriage. An explicit state constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman 
could prevent judicial excesses like the Baker decision from being 
repeated in other states. 
 
of the Universal Declaration, “[t]he idea that the family ‘is entitled to protection by society and the 
State . . . had already appeared in several constitutions [noting France and Germany], and would 
shortly appear in many others.”); Sarah Andrews, Protecting Privacy Through Government 
Regulation, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 1 (2001) (“At the national level, the legal right to privacy is 
included in the constitution of most countries. In many this is framed as a right to respect for the 
home, family life and private correspondence.”); Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South 
Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 695, 701 (1996) (“We also found it quite striking, in going 
through the constitutions of various countries of the world, that some include the right to family life 
and others do not. Pakistan has it; India does not. China has it; Taiwan does not; Singapore does not. 
Germany has it; Austria does not. Belgium has a very indirect form of protection—privacy of the 
family; the Netherlands has nothing at all.”). 
 
10WARDLE.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:35 PM 
309 CURIOUS CASE 353 
Appendix A 
Law Review Articles Citing Baker v. Vermont 
Compiled and reviewed by Justin W. Starr* 
 
This reviewer examined a total of 266 law review articles to 
determine how they treated the Vermont Supreme Court=s decision in 
Baker v. Vermont. The articles were selected by AKeycite@-ing Baker v. 
State using Westlaw and limiting the references to law review articles. 
This was done for the last time in the first week of September, 2003. The 
articles listed as positive either explicitly praised the decision, or made 
arguments supportive of or in sympathy with those made in Baker. For 
example, if the article was arguing in favor of same-sex marriage and 
cited to Baker, regardless of the exact proposition which Baker is cited 
for, it was counted as positive. The articles were classified solely upon 
their internal content, and some articles were listed as neutral even 
though other writings of the article author suggested that the author had a 
positive or negative view of Baker. The overall results are: 
 
Positive, Support Baker       - 139 articles 
Positive, but not far enough - 28 articles 
Neutral                                 - 71 articles 
Negative, Criticize Baker    - 27 articles 
Abolish Marriage                 - 1 article 
TOTAL                                - 266 articles 
I.  POSITIVE ABOUT BAKER B 139 ARTICLES 
Patrick J. Dooley, Note, I Am Who I Am, Or Am I? A Comparison of 
the Equal Protection of Sexual Minorities in Canadian and U.S. Courts: 
Immutability Has Only Found a Home North of the Border, 17 ARIZ. J. 
INT=L & COMP. L. 371 (2000). 
Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at The Crossroads: On Baker, 
Common Benefits and Facial Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935 (2000). 
Natalie Brown Michalek, Note, Littleton v. Prange: How Voiding 
Transsexual Marriage Affects the Fundamental Right of Marriage, 52 
BAYLOR L. REV. 727 (2000). 
Lawrence Friedman & Charles H. Baron, Baker v. State and the 
Promise of the New Judicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 125 (2001). 
 
* J.D. 2004, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; research assistant to 
Professor Lynn D. Wardle. 
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Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National 
Lessons from Vermont=s State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-
Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2001). 
Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same-
Sex Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 
883 (2000). 
Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, 
Interdependence and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265 
(2000). 
Ryan Nishimoto, Marriage Makes Cents: How Law & Economics 
Justifies Same-Sex Marriage, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 379 (2003) 
(reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002)). 
William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts: Section 5 Of The 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay 
State Employees Under the Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2002). 
Kara S. Suffredini, Note, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual 
Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279 (2001). 
Sharmila Roy Grossman, Comment, The Illusory Rights of Marvin 
V. Marvin for the Same-Sex Couple Versus the Preferable Canadian 
Alternative-M. V. H., 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 547 (2002). 
Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An 
Overview of Women=s Rights and Family Law in the United States 
During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000). 
Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: 
Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439 (2003). 
Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil 
Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363 (2002). 
Greg Johnson, In Praise of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315 
(2002). 
Laurie A. Rompala, Note, Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests 
of the Child: Why Illinois Courts Must Recognize Same-Sex Parents 
Seeking Visitation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1933 (2001). 
Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil 
Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2000). 
Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include 
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation 
Equality, 101 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 392 (2001). 
Dale Carpenter, The Limits Of Gaylaw, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 603 
(2000) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING 
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)). 
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Julie Jones, Money, Sex, and the Religious Right: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Federally Funded Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Sexuality 
Education, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1075 (2002). 
Mark Wolinsky, Stereotypes, Tolerance and Acceptance: Gay Rights 
in Courts of Law and Public Opinion, 19 DEL. LAWYER 13 (2001). 
Linda J. Lacey, The ATake Back Vermont Campaign@: A Classic 
Case of Media Manipulation, 19 DICK. J. INT=L L. 435 (2001). 
Scott C. Seufert, Going Dutch?: A Comparison of the Vermont Civil 
Union Law to the Same-Sex Marriage Law of the Netherlands, 19 DICK. 
J. INT=L L. 449 (2001). 
Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, or, How America 
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn=t, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1559 (2000). 
David B. Wexler, Lowering the Volume Through Legal Doctrine: A 
Promising Path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence Scholarship, 3 FLA. 
COASTAL L.J. 123 (2002). 
Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Man a Man, and When is a Woman a 
Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 745 (2000). 
James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (2001). 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and 
Rights of Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721 (2001). 
Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 
GEO. L.J. 2297 (2001) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A 
TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)). 
Edward Brumby, Note, What is in a Name: Why the European Same-
Sex Partnership Acts Create a Valid Marital Relationship, 28 GA. J. 
INT=L & COMP. L. 145 (1999). 
Developments in the LawCThe Law of Marriage and Family, 
Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of 
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2004 (2003). 
Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters Gaylaw: 
Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet. 113 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (2000) 
(reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE 
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)). 
Huong Thien Nguyen, Note, Irrational Prejudice: The Military=s 
Exclusion of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Service Members After Romer 
v. Evans, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 461 (2001). 
Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: 
Some Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 
(2000). 
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Jessica A. Hoogs, Note, Divorce Without Marriage: Establishing a 
Uniform Dissolution Procedure for Domestic Partners Through a 
Comparative Analysis of European and American Domestic Partner 
Laws, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (2003). 
Christopher D. Sawyer, Note, Practice What You Preach: 
California=s Obligation to Give Full Faith and Credit to the Vermont 
Civil Union, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 727 (2003). 
Renee M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Note, Employment 
Benefits: Will Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 357 (2000). 
Pamela M. Jablow, Note, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: 
Protecting Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2000). 
Melanie D. Price, The Privacy Paradox: The Divergent Paths of the 
United States Supreme Court and State Courts on Issues of Sexuality, 33 
IND. L. REV. 863 (2000). 
Mark E. Wojcik, et al., International Human Rights, 34 INT=L 
LAWYER 761 (2000). 
Denise C. Hammond, Immigration And Sexual Orientation: 
Developing Standards, Options, and Obstacles, 77 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 113 (2000). 
Casey L. Westover, The Twenty-Eighth Amendment: Why the 
Constitution Should Be Amended to Grant Congress the Power to 
Legislate in Furtherance of the General Welfare, 36 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 327 (2003). 
Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United 
States Supreme Court Shows State Courts The Way, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 499 (2002). 
Linda Kelly, Marriage For Sale: The Mail-Order Bride Industry and 
the Changing Value of Marriage, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 175 (2001). 
Christopher Rizzo, Banning State Recognition of Same-Sex 
Relationships: Constitutional Implications of Nebraska=s Initiative 416, 
11 J.L. & POL=Y 1 (2002). 
Audra Elizabeth Laabs, Lesbian ART, 19 LAW & INEQ. 65 (2001). 
Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy, and the Changing Social 
Status of Homosexuality: Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights 
Jurisprudence, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 119 (2003). 
Tobin A. Sparling, All in the Family: Recognizing the Unifying 
Potential of Same-Sex Marriage, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 187 (2001). 
Christopher S. Hargis, Note, Queer Reasoning: Immigration Policy, 
Baker v. State of Vermont, and the (Non)Recognition Of Same-Gender 
Relationships, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 211 (2001). 
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